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AN ECOLOGICAL THEORY OF STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION
NICHOLAS S. BRYNER*
ABSTRACT
Canons of construction serve as a set of ground rules that judges rely on in
interpreting statutes. Substantive canons of construction, in particular, are principles and presumptions that point judges in a specific policy direction in order to serve
underlying public values. Many of these substantive canons share a common justification: judges have developed them to mitigate threats of irreversible harm to vulnerable and underrepresented interests and to incentivize clarity in the legislative
process. This Article argues that environmental interests—the interests of present
and future generations in maintaining ecological conditions that support life—merit
similar protection. Therefore, judges should employ an environmental canon of construction: whenever possible, statutes must be read in a manner that best promotes
ecological integrity and sustainability for present and future generations.
The Article examines several common substantive canons and concludes that
environmental interests and values justify a similar canon. An environmental canon
of construction also finds support in the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),
which provides that “the policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States
shall be interpreted and administered in accordance with” the environmental policies listed in the statute. Recognizing a substantive environmental canon would
place ecological concerns on the same level, legally and rhetorically, with other fundamental rights and concerns—granting legitimacy to the consideration of environmental impacts in judicial reasoning and bringing our legal system in line with scientific understanding of our role and responsibility in an ecologically interdependent
world.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Common theories of statutory interpretation cast the connection between
legislative and judicial authorities as analogous to a principal-agent relationship.1 At
the federal level, the principal-agent framework focuses on the primacy of Congress’s constitutional authority to legislate—to make law.2 Courts serve as “agents”
of the legislative branch, tasked with interpreting the language of the statute and
giving it meaning that can be applied to a particular case or controversy.3
Textualism, intentionalism, and pragmatism all represent different ways of
thinking about how courts best fulfill their duty as agents of Congress. 4 These
schools of thought in statutory interpretation diverge on the question of which
sources are valid or helpful in ascertaining what Congress has established as law.
For textualists and purposivists alike, the starting point in reading a statute is, of
course, reading the statute.5 While textualists argue that the text is the law,6 others
may define the law as the legislature’s intent; that is, the law is reflected in the
words of the statute, but is not simply the set of words of the statute itself.7

1. See, e.g., FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 3 (2009); Cass
R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 415 (1989) (discussing the
theory of courts as agents as “the most prominent conception of the role of courts in statutory construction,” while highlighting the limitations and weaknesses of this approach).
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
3. While the principal-agent analogy is imperfect, it has been influential because it seems consistent with the narrative of judicial restraint and the judiciary as the “weakest” and “least dangerous”
branch of government. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton); see also, e.g., Guido Calabresi, Being
Honest about Being Honest Agents, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 907, 907 (2010) (agreeing that “judges should
be the honest agents of the enacting legislature” while expressing different views about how judges best
accomplish this); Frank H. Easterbrook, Judges as Honest Agents, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 915, 915 (2010)
(“[F]aithful application of statutes is part of our heritage from the United Kingdom, and thus what the phrase
‘the judicial Power’ in Article III means.”).
4. See generally CROSS, supra note 1.
5. See, e.g., id. at 56–57.
6. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 22 (2012).
7. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Siegel, Symmetries—And Asymmetries—Between Theories of Statutory
Interpretation, 99 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 182, 186 (2014).
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Regardless of the approach, statutory construction is about more than simply
looking up the dictionary definitions to the words that Congress has written down
on pages and sent off for the president’s signature. All theories and notions of statutory construction rely, to at least some degree, on some extratextual baseline, or
rather, a set of principles and hermeneutics for arriving at the meaning of words,
series of words, and phrases in a statute.8 Many of these ground rules are expressed
as judicial canons of construction, which offer a collection of flexible tools for understanding legislative language.
The literature on canons describes various types: linguistic, referential, and
substantive.9 Linguistic canons provide general grammatical or syntactic rules for
reading the language of a statute,10 while referential canons “refer[] the Court to
an outside or preexisting source to determine statutory meaning.” 11
Substantive canons, on the other hand, create presumptions that point judges
in a particular policy direction, based on the statute’s subject matter or the interests
that the statute affects.12 Eskridge and Frickey distinguish substantive canons from
the others: although competing substantive canons exist and may push and pull in
different directions, the substantive canons as a whole “are not policy neutral” and
“represent value choices by the Court.”13
Many of the most frequently used substantive canons share a common justification: judges have developed them to mitigate threats of irreversible harm to
vulnerable and underrepresented interests and to incentivize clarity in the legislative process.14 They exist to serve underlying public values that may be threatened
by a less-than-careful interpretation of the law. For example, in criminal law, the
rule of lenity, as a substantive canon of construction, requires that ambiguities in
8. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 1, at 411 (“The meaning of a statute inevitably depends on the
precepts with which interpreters approach its text. Statutes do not have pre-interpretive meanings, and the
process of interpretation requires courts to draw on background principles.”).
9. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 595 (1992).
10. Id. Some examples of linguistic canons include the rule that the expression of one thing is the
exclusion of another, as well as the rule that words, especially those in a series, are defined and contextualized by their neighbors (noscitur a sociis).
11. Id. Karl Llewellyn’s famous article listed many of these two types of canons, arguing that
competing counter-canons make their application unreliable. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory
of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Cannons about How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395
(1950).
12. See, e.g., Anita S. Krishnakumar, Reconsidering Substantive Canons, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 825
(2017); Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 9, at 595 (suggesting that substantive canons are rooted in “substantive values drawn from the common law, federal statutes, or the United States Constitution”).
13. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 9, at 595–96. Krishnakumar divides substantive canons according to strength of the canon (i.e. the level of clarity required to preclude the canon’s application). Her
three categories include “presumptions,” “‘liberal’ or ‘strict’ construction canons,” and “clear statement
rules.” Krishnakumar, supra note 12, at 835.
14. The best-known substantive canons that reflect these goals include, for example, the rule of
lenity (criminal statutes are interpreted in a manner that favors the defendant), the rule of liberal or broad
construction of statutes with a “remedial purpose,” the rule of constitutional avoidance (operating, in part,
as a buffer for constitutionally-protected interests), and the “Indian canons of construction” in U.S.-Native
American law. See infra Part II. Common substantive canons of construction address structural questions
with regard to federalism or the separation of powers, such as the canon requiring a clear statement to
waive sovereign immunity or the presumption of the availability of judicial review.
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criminal statutes be construed in favor of defendants. 15 The rule protects against
due process concerns, safeguarding criminal defendants from irreversible harm, by
requiring a clear statement that the conduct in question is proscribed before a law
will be applied to deprive them of their rights and liberties.
This Article argues that environmental interests—the interests of both present and future generations in maintaining ecological conditions that support life—
merit similar protection. Human activity in today’s world—urban development, agriculture, industrial activity and pollution, large-scale landscape modifications, and
the release of atmosphere-changing greenhouse gases—has reached a scale that
exposes the sensitivity and vulnerability of our environment. 16 Although environmental science indicates that ecosystems are dynamic, rather than stable, pressure
from human activity can affect the resilience of those ecosystems and lead to drastic change.17 Every action we take at a nationwide scale impacts our surrounding
environment, and many human-driven ecological crises—climate change, biodiversity loss, and air and water pollution—have the potential to create significant and
irreversible harm to present and future generations.
Environmental crises pose a great risk for the well-being of our society; at the
same time, market and government failures show how environmental interests remain vulnerable and underrepresented in the operations of the usual political process. Just as judges rely on substantive canons of construction to mitigate threats
of irreversible harm in criminal law, U.S.-Native American law, and other areas,
judges should employ an environmental canon of construction: when possible, statutes must be read in a manner that best promotes ecological integrity and sustainability for present and future generations. Only a clear statement in a statute may
overcome this rule.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II begins with a discussion of statutory
interpretation theory and several key substantive canons of construction. 18 Part II
also examines the justification for various statutory interpretation presumptions
that favor vulnerable or underrepresented interests, making the case that environmental interests should be treated with the same regard by applying an environmental canon of construction.19 Part III provides additional justification for an environmental canon of construction by looking to the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA).20 NEPA is most widely known for its requirement that federal agencies
assess environmental impacts (and consider alternatives) before engaging in major

15. See infra Section II.A.
16. See, e.g., Sean L. Maxwell et. al., Biodiversity: The Ravages of Guns, Nets and Bulldozers, 536
NATURE 143 (2016) (analyzing the most significant threats to endangered species worldwide, including overexploitation, agricultural activity, urban development, invasion and disease, pollution, system modification,
and climate change).
17. See, e.g., C.S. Holling, Resilience and Stability of Ecological Systems, 4 ANN. REV. ECOLOGY &
SYSTEMATICS 1, 7 (1973) (“[N]atural systems have a high capacity to absorb change without dramatically altering. But this resilient character has its limits, and when the limits are passed . . . the system rapidly
changes to another condition”).
18. See infra Part II.
19. See infra Part II.
20. See infra Part III; National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370h (2012).
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actions.21 Yet NEPA calls for more than environmental impact assessment: the statute also includes a specific charge that “the policies, regulations, and public laws of
the United States . . . be interpreted and administered . . .” in accordance with the
environmental policies defined in that Act.22 Although courts have never explored
in depth the reach or the consequences of this provision in NEPA for judicial interpretation of federal statutes, it serves as a clear statutory mandate in support of an
environmental canon of construction. Part IV acknowledges that an environmental
canon of construction would represent a shift in American jurisprudence.23 Other,
similar shifts—changing doctrines of standing in U.S. law and examples in comparative law of judicial use of environmental principles on statutory interpretation—
provide useful lessons for how this transition can work. Part V explores how the
environmental canon of construction could operate in practice, using as examples
some recent cases where it may have had an impact in statutory construction.24 Part
VI addresses some potential counterarguments and issues for further exploration,
followed by a brief conclusion.25
Applying an environmental canon of construction in U.S. law would be a transformational change from a doctrinal standpoint, though the practical impacts would
likely be incremental, rather than radical. In most statutory interpretation cases,
the rule would probably not affect the outcome. As with other canons, a clear counter-environmental statement in the plain language of the statute would overcome
the rule’s application.26 Further, those who criticize the notion of canons, arguing
that judges use them only as post hoc justifications for decisions, rather than as
inputs to judicial decision-making, would not expect a new canon to have any onthe-ground impact.27
Notwithstanding these limitations, developing and employing an environmental canon of construction would bring benefits in three significant ways. The first is
substantive: to the extent that the canon influences judicial decisions, it will lead to
a readjustment of values in the legal system, promoting more equitable outcomes
for people affected by pollution and more environmentally sustainable outcomes
that protect future generations’ interests. Second, as a procedural matter, the
canon of construction requires Congress to act deliberately on environmental issues—clear statements are required for statutes that will negatively impact the environment and all of us that depend on it.
Finally, the canon can have an impact through the message conveyed simply
by its recognition. This is because the content of substantive canons helps signal
which types of interests and concerns that we as a society should expect judges to
consider when statutes may be open to multiple interpretations. Recognition of a

21. NEPA § 102(1), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(1).
22. Id.
23. See infra Part IV.
24. See infra Part V.
25. See infra Part VI.
26. See, e.g., Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 9 (discussing “clear statement” rules).
27. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Solan, Precedent in Statutory Interpretation, 94 N.C. L. REV. 1165
(2016); see infra Part II.
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canon of construction places it within the appropriate bounds for making conclusions as to statutory meaning,28 even if the existence of competing canons and competing principles means that no one canon will guarantee a precise outcome in a
particular case.29 Articulating a substantive environmental canon places ecological
concerns on the same level, legally and rhetorically, with other fundamental rights
and concerns. Doing so grants legitimacy to the consideration of the environment
in judicial decision-making—an important reform to bring our legal system in line
with scientific understanding of our role and responsibility in an ecologically interdependent world.
II. SUBSTANTIVE CANONS OF CONSTRUCTION AND ENVIRONMENTAL INTERESTS
Canons of construction are, generally speaking, the ground rules for judges in
interpreting statutes. Eskridge described them as the “lingua franca of statutory
interpretation.”30 Substantive canons, within this lingua franca, are principles designed by judges “to protect important background norms derived from the Constitution, common-law practices, or policies related to particular subject areas.” 31
Some of the substantive canons protect institutional concerns, maintaining relationships of federalism, and monitoring the separation of powers among government branches.32 Yet judges have formulated a set of these substantive canons of
construction in order to tip the scales of justice, at times, to protect important, vulnerable interests.
Critics of the canons see them as meaningless, at best, and perhaps nefarious;
because canons can frequently be found to support either side of a dispute over
interpretation, judges may simply choose whichever ones best suit their prior assumptions or policy preferences with regard to the case.33 According to this line of
thinking, canons are unhelpful because they fail to provide predictable consistency
in how judges will interpret statutory language.34

28. See, e.g., Solan, supra note 27, at 1186 (“[J]udges continue to cite these canons, not as the
starting point for justifying their application in a particular case, but rather for the purpose of suggesting
that they are sufficiently authoritative because they were used in earlier cases.”).
29. Solan argues that substantive canons “are notoriously elastic and are applied so unevenly as
to appear more as background values than as precise interpretive principles[,]” but notes that “courts take
them seriously, and they appear to influence the outcome of cases.” Id. at 1187. In a recent empirical study,
Anita Krishnakumar finds that Supreme Court Justices “duel[] over most textualist-preferred interpretive
tools [at] roughly the same [rate as] . . . over purposivist-preferred interpretive tools[,]” suggesting that
linguistic canons do not have any greater effect in ensuring consistent or predictable interpretations than
tools such as legislative history or reference to congressional intent or purpose. Anita S. Krishnakumar, Dueling Canons, 65 DUKE L.J. 909, 914 (2016). All of this is to say that, with some frequency, judges do regularly
employ canons of construction and seem to view them as legitimate bases for judicial reasoning in statutory
interpretation cases, even if, in theory and in practice, they do not effectively constrain judges’ interpretations in a consistent way.
30. William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the “Judicial Power” in
Statutory Interpretation, 1776-1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 1100 (2001) (emphasis added).
31. Krishnakumar, supra note 12, at 833.
32. Id. at 897–99.
33. See Llewellyn, supra note 11, at 401–06 (listing the “thrust” and “parry” of opposing canons).
34. Some recent scholarship has criticized substantive canons for playing too large a role in statutory interpretation and has suggested that judges assert fidelity to textualism while importing their policy

2018

AN ECOLOGICAL THEORY OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

9

Skepticism as to whether canons of construction actually “bind” judges or
cause them to reach results contrary to their general disposition or values does not
make the canons meaningless. As Eskridge and Frickey have argued, canons may be
important as outputs, even in cases where they do not appear to have been significant inputs in influencing a judicial decision: “canons are one means by which the
Court expresses the value choices that it is making or strategies it is taking when it
interprets statutes.”35 Some measure of judicial choice or value judgment is necessarily a part of statutory interpretation, whether done in a textualist framework or
otherwise.36 Thus, canons can be meaningful as a way of organizing and legitimizing
the discourse, and of laying out the factors and considerations that judges take into
account in going about their task.37 Context, to some degree, dictates the weight
given to each of those factors and considerations. 38
Below are several substantive canons and presumptions that cut across different areas of law, with a brief examination of the source and justification for these
canons. Environmental interests are analogous to many of the values—common
law, statutory, and constitutional—underlying these canons. If such canons and
rules are justified, then judges should also apply a robust environmental canon of
construction.
A. Rule of Lenity
In criminal law, the rule of lenity originated as a common law principle: “penal
statutes should be strictly construed against the government or parties seeking to
enforce statutory penalties and in favor of the persons on whom penalties are
sought to be imposed.” 39 Judges and commentators have justified this rule based
on two main reasons: first, notice and due process concerns; and second, separation of powers.40

preferences through the use of substantive canons. See, e.g., Krishnakumar, supra note 12, at 835–39 (noting, while disagreeing with, this argument as the “prevailing wisdom” on substantive canons). Krishnakumar
finds in an empirical study of Supreme Court decisions that the Roberts Court relied on substantive canons
in 14.4% of a set of 603 statutory cases from 2005 to 2011. Id. at 850. This rate is lower than for other
interpretive tools, but still represents a significant number of cases. Id. at 850–855.
35. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 9, at 596.
36. E.g., Siegel, supra note 7, at 184.
37. On the subject of the rule of lenity, Lawrence Solan argued that although it is “unrealistic” to
expect consistency from rules of statutory interpretation,
[w]e can try to set a framework . . . to structure disputes so that disagreements focus on the
issues upon which disagreement exists. In that way, even when we do not like the result of a
particular case, we can at least say that the Court gave serious consideration to the significant
issues.
Lawrence M. Solan, Law, Language, and Lenity, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 57, 144 (1998).
38. See id.
39. Id. at 58 (quoting 2B NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 59.03 (5th ed.
1992)).
40. See, e.g., Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 427 (1985) (“Application of the rule of lenity
ensures that criminal statutes will provide fair warning concerning conduct rendered illegal and strikes the
appropriate balance between the legislature, the prosecutor, and the court in defining criminal liability.”).
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Lenity serves due process interests by requiring that criminal statutes provide
sufficiently clear notice of what specific conduct is prohibited.41 Another justification for the rule is that it furthers separation of powers, on the premise that the
role of defining criminal conduct should rest with the legislative branch and should
not be enlarged by the judiciary or left too much to prosecutorial discretion.
The underlying social value that the rule supports is the protection of accused
persons from the risk of serious or irreversible harm to their liberty in the case of
misinterpretation.42 The rule of lenity is thus motivated by “[a] combination of
deeply held values and the frailties of the human condition.” 43 A brief exploration
of how the rule of lenity has been applied sheds light on how it fulfills this value and
provides examples of how the recognition of a substantive canon of construction
impacts judges’ articulated decision-making process in judicial opinions interpreting
statutes.
In seventeenth-century England, judges developed the rule as a means of
thwarting harsh penal statutes, most of which called for capital punishment. 44
Judges would employ linguistic ambiguities as a means to temper the applicability
of these laws, even when other readings would be more consistent with what, in all
likelihood, was the intent of the statute. 45
In the United States, and especially in the modern era, the rule has been applied more narrowly. Chief Justice John Marshall wrote that the rule was based
both “on the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals; and on the plain
principle that the power of punishment is vested in the legislative, not in the judicial
department.”46 Per Marshall, “though penal laws are to be construed strictly, they
are not to be construed so strictly as to defeat the obvious intention of the legislature.”47 Therefore, the rule had shifted from being a vehicle to frustrate (unduly
harsh) legislative purposes to one that was limited to applications where the legislature’s intention was unclear. The rule is instead couched as deference to the legislature, with a preference for under applying the law rather than extending it—but
with the purpose of erring on the side of preserving individual rights. In other
words, given the importance of the right to liberty as a value in our legal system,
courts decline to apply criminal statutes unless the legislature has made it clear that
the conduct is to be prohibited and punished.
41. See McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931) (“Although it is not likely that a criminal
will carefully consider the text of the law before he murders or steals, it is reasonable that a fair warning
should be given to the world in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends
to do if a certain line is passed.”) (quoted in Solan, supra note 37, at 134).
42. See, e.g., Shon Hopwood, Clarity in Criminal Law, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 695, 701 (2017). In an
era of criminal law codified in statute, distinct from the legal system of common-law crimes in which the
rule of lenity originated, the rule must balance these goals with deference to the legislative branch. See
Solan, supra note 37, at 59.
43. Solan, supra note 37, at 143.
44. See id. at 87.
45. See id. at 87–88 (describing examples of courts holding that a statute prohibiting “‘stealing
horses’” did not apply to a person who stole a single horse and that another criminalizing “‘stealing sheep
or other cattle’” was too ambiguous to be applied to any animal other than sheep themselves).
46. United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76, 95 (1820).
47. Id. The question before the Court in the case was whether a statute that criminalized manslaughter on the “high seas” should be extended, by implication, to apply to conduct on a river in foreign
territory. Id. at 87.
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By the 1950s, the Supreme Court described the rule of lenity as thus: although
criminal statutes should generally be given “commonsensical meaning . . . when
choice has to be made between two readings of what conduct Congress has made
a crime, it is appropriate, before we choose the harsher alternative, to require that
Congress should have spoken in language that is clear and definite.” 48
As Solan has argued, a less-frequent application of the rule of lenity made
sense in the jurisprudence that had developed by the mid-twentieth century.49 Expanded use of legislative history and other contextual tools of statutory construction provided additional opportunities for courts to ascertain a clear meaning of the
statute, making a determination that a statute is truly ambiguous and the actual
application of the rule relatively rare.50
These shifts in statutory interpretation have perhaps relegated the rule of lenity to a less prominent status, as a tiebreaker when other rules fail to resolve the
question. In some cases, judges decide on a lenient interpretation on other grounds,
simply noting that the rule of lenity also supports that position. 51 However, courts
continue to demonstrate the importance of the rule by citing it even when they
decline to apply it. In a 2016 case before the Supreme Court, Lockhart v. United
States, Justice Sotomayor wrote that “[w]e have used the lenity principle to resolve
ambiguity in favor of the defendant only ‘at the end of the process of construing
what Congress has expressed’ when the ordinary canons of statutory construction
have revealed no satisfactory construction.”52
Lockhart involved the application of mandatory minimum and increased maximum sentences for persons with certain prior convictions in the statute criminalizing possession of child pornography.53 The six-Justice majority noted that two canons—the “last antecedent” rule and the “series-qualifier principle”— would point
to opposing interpretations of the statute in question, but declined to apply the
canon that would reach the more lenient result, holding instead that only the last
antecedent rule was “well supported by context.”54 Justice Kagan, on the other

48. United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221–22 (1952). For additional examples and explanation of the rule, see Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 9, at 600–01.
49. Several states also enacted legislation to abolish the rule; however, this has served to minimize it, rather than eliminate it entirely, as courts in California and New York, for example, have continued
to use a form of it on the grounds of fairness and notice. See Solan, supra note 37, at 122–28.
50. See id. at 97–108.
51. See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015) (overturning a conviction under the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act for the destruction of fish that were evidence of a violation of federal fishing laws); see
also infra Section V.C.
52. Lockhart v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 958, 968 (2016) (quoting Callanan v. United States, 364
U.S. 587, 596 (1961)). In another case, later in 2016, involving a bank fraud statute, the Supreme Court
restated its recent jurisprudence, quoting from Callanan as well: “the rule [of lenity] applies if ‘at the end of
the process of construing what Congress has expressed,’ there is ‘a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the
statute.’” Shaw v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 462, 469 (2016) (citations omitted) (quoting Callanan, 364 U.S.
at 596; Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138–39 (1998)). In Shaw, the Supreme Court held that a
statute prohibiting “defraud[ing] a financial institution” could be applied against a defendant, even where
it could only be shown that he had the specific intent to steal money deposited in a bank yet held by an
individual, rather than intent to deceive the bank itself. Shaw, 137 S. Ct. at 468–69.
53. Lockhart, 136 S. Ct. at 961.
54. Id. at 968.
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hand, argued in her dissent that the series-qualifier canon was supported by legislative history, but noted also that “if any doubt remained, the rule of lenity would
command the same result.”55
The dialogue among Supreme Court Justices in recent cases such as Lockhart
shows that the rule of lenity still remains as a legitimate authority for judges to turn
to in interpreting ambiguous statutes. Both sides in such disputes find it necessary
to address the rule in crafting their arguments. Inconsistency due to the lack of a
definitive theory as to when a statute becomes sufficiently ambiguous for the application of the rule of lenity (or many other substantive canons of construction)
can make the rule seem flexible.56 However, even if the rule cannot provide an error-proof method for predicting the outcome of a particular case in advance, that
would not mean it fails to serve important interests. 57
The “tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals[,]”58 as John Marshall
put it, suggests why the rule maintains some currency. Criminal law pits an individual’s liberty against the interests of the State. Because an errant interpretation may
lead to irreversible harm to that liberty, the mere recognition of the rule of lenity
encourages judges to wrestle with that balancing of interests in a way that might
not otherwise occur; judges can rely on the rule in considering the equities of each
competing reading of an ambiguous statute.
B. U.S.-Native American Law: Indian Canons of Construction
A second example of substantive canons of construction in the United States
that tip the scales toward vulnerable or underrepresented interests is the set of socalled “Indian canons of construction” in law regarding Native American tribes.
These canons require that “treaties, agreements, statutes, and executive orders be
liberally construed in favor of the Indians and that all ambiguities are to be resolved
in their favor.”59 Further, treaties are to be read “in the sense in which they would
naturally be understood by the Indians.” 60 Federal statutes, dating to an 1834 Act
of Congress, incorporate the same rule in property disputes: in trials between a Native American and a white person, “the burden of proof shall rest upon the white
55. Id. at 969 (Kagan, J., dissenting). The focus by both the majority and dissent on the wording
of the statute, despite general agreement that it was not well drafted, belies the importance of textualism
to the Court in recent years. See David A. Strauss, The Plain Language Court, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 651, 663–
64 (2016). No one would really suggest that Congress, in drafting the statute at issue in Lockhart, was considering the finer points of whether the “last antecedent” or “series-qualifier” canons would be applied
when courts interpreted it. As Strauss puts it, “it is very likely that the words were not written with that case
in mind; if they had been written with that case in mind, the authors would have made the answer clear.”
Id. at 669. In other words, the Court is accomplishing something other than deference to legislative intent
with this line of arguments; however, the canons provided common ground on which the differing sides
could rely in outlining their reasoning.
56. See Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of Structure, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 885, 890
(2004).
57. See id. at 890–91.
58. United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76, 95 (1820).
59. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 2.02[1] (Nell Jessup Newton ed., LexisNexis 2012);
see also Cty. of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 247 (1985).
60. Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 676
(1979) (quoting Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 11 (1899)).
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person, whenever the Indian shall make out a presumption of title in himself from
the fact of previous possession or ownership.” 61
The history of U.S. judicial decisions with regard to Native American peoples
is replete with examples of grave injustice, both as European-descended settlers
moved west, and later as the federal government pursued cycles of cultural assimilation policies.62 However, U.S. courts adopted rules of statutory construction that,
at least in cases where courts saw ambiguity, cut against the broader pattern of
dispossession, in favor of Native American interests.63 These rules are consistent
with a theory of substantive canons of construction rooted in public values of fairness and the protection of minorities and vulnerable interests.
Early U.S.-Native American law jurisprudence described the relationship between the United States and Native American tribes in paternalistic terms, as a trust
relationship, with tribes as “domestic dependent nations . . . in a state of pupilage”
and the federal government as a “guardian.” 64 Notwithstanding the limits this legal
view placed on the autonomy of the tribes, it did provide “an aspirational aura over
federal Indian law” that gave at least one justification for pro-Indian canons of construction.65
In the seminal case, Worcester v. Georgia, Chief Justice Marshall described the
Cherokee Nation as “a distinct community” but a “weak state,” placed “under the
protection of one more powerful.”66 Language in the 1791 Cherokee treaty at issue
in the case conceded to the U.S. Congress “the sole and exclusive right of regulating
the trade with the Indians, and managing all their affairs, as they think proper.”67
Although the Court could perhaps have read the italicized phrase to include political
management, which would undercut Cherokee sovereignty, Marshall interpreted
this as referring only to subjects connected with trade. 68 To go any further, the
Court reasoned, could not conceivably have been within the tribe’s intent and understanding of the agreement represented by the treaty. 69 Frickey described the
case as “[beginning] the notion that treaties are to be interpreted as the Indians
would have understood them.”70

61. 25 U.S.C. § 194 (2012). For an example of a case involving this provision, see Wilson v. Omaha
Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653 (1979) (reaffirming the standard of shifting of the burden of proof, pursuant to
25 U.S.C. § 194, but remanding the case on other grounds for resolution in state courts).
62. See generally Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823) (recognizing only a “right of occupancy” by Native Americans to their lands and legalizing the extinguishment of Indian title by conquest or
purchase). For more on Johnson and other cases, see WALTER R. ECHO-HAWK, IN THE COURTS OF THE CONQUEROR:
THE 10 WORST INDIAN LAW CASES EVER DECIDED (2010). The most grievous legal injustices to Native Americans
were, of course, not limited to court decisions, but also included legislation. See, e.g., The Dawes Act of
1887, Pub. L. 49-119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (breaking up tribal ownership of lands).
63. David M. Blurton, Cannons of Construction, Stare Decisis and Dependent Indian Communities:
A Test of Judicial Integrity, 16 ALASKA L. REV. 37, 39–40 (1999).
64. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831).
65. Philip P. Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the Dynamic Nature of Federal Indian Law, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 1137, 1176–77 (1990).
66. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 561 (1832).
67. Id. at 553 (emphasis in original).
68. Id. at 554.
69. Id. at 553–54.
70. Frickey, supra note 65, at 1177.
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The preference for construing laws and policies related to Native Americans
in their favor serves a goal of promoting clarity in actions among recognized sovereigns, as well as substantive concerns of fairness. In recognition of the fact that negotiations between Native Americans and the U.S. government took place in English, and on terms dictated mostly (if not entirely) by the United States, Marshall’s
interpretation in Worcester reflected an understanding that this process indicated
great inequity between the parties and the vast difference in their bargaining
power.71
Marshall also went further. In the decades that had passed between the Cherokee’s treaty and the time Worcester was decided, the United States had “operat[ed] on the assumption that it had plenary power over tribes” and had, among
other things, elected Andrew Jackson.72 However, Marshall maintained the importance of the earlier treaty. As Frickey describes it, principles of interpretation
required “measuring Indian interests from their strongest historical perspective,
even if . . . in the contemporary circumstances they seem weaker.”73 “Essentially . .
. Justice Marshall decided that it should not count against Indian interests that colonization was taking a toll.”74
Given Marshall’s political position as a judge representing the institutions of
the colonizers, a charitable reading of his jurisprudence—which had disastrous
practical consequences for Native American rights—is that he was faced with the
inevitable conclusion that he “could not entertain fundamental challenges to colonization.”75 Instead, Marshall used rules of interpretation to displace the responsibility for the destruction of tribal sovereignty toward Congress, which could ratify
colonial prerogatives through a clearer expression of legislation. 76
There are significant theoretical parallels between the Indian canons of construction and an envisioned environmental canon of construction. I do not mean to
compare interpretations of environmental law with the tremendous, unspeakable
human cost and injustice that Europeans have waged against the Americas’ original
peoples over more than five centuries. The specific legal tool of the canon of construction, though, is instructive in looking for analogies to environmental law principles. Recognition of an interpretative rule favoring environmental concerns remains within the existing anthropocentric and utilitarian order that prioritizes human interests over “nature.” As such, it does not guarantee environmentally optimal or beneficial outcomes. Rather, it encourages judges to engage with the clash
of values inherent in environmental and natural resources disputes, whether they
implicate intra- or intergenerational equality or more “pure” ecological concerns.
As the Marshall Court’s decisions forced Congress to take responsibility for its policies, an environmental canon places the responsibility for making decisions of lasting environmental consequences on the legislative branch, with greater deliberation required, rather than allowing the legal system to continue to shore up anthropocentric decisions under the guise of tradition and inertia.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 1226.
Id. at 1227.
Id. at 1128.
Id.
Id.
See Frickey, supra note 65, at 1128.
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An additional lesson is the suggestion that, despite the passing of time, courts
can continue to regard vulnerable interests at their apex. This is tremendously consequential in cases involving environmental degradation where, for example, the
manner for setting the baseline condition of a parcel of land and its surroundings
can determine what property owners can legally do or the extent to which governments can regulate uses without effectuating a compensable taking. 77 Reasonable
expectations regarding the use of property should, in this way, depend not only on
the point in time in which environmental and ecosystem services on the land were
at their lowest value (and in which property owners enjoyed the greatest discretion), but also on consideration of the full value of those environmental interests, 78
free from and prior to human-caused degradation.
In more recent times, reliance on the canons in Indian law has declined; during
a prolonged period of the Rehnquist Court, from 1986-2001, Native American tribes
lost seventy-seven percent of their cases before the Supreme Court. 79 However, as
with the rule of lenity, the continued recognition of the rule— even if it does not
always prove determinative in a case—demonstrates a degree of judicial commitment to the value of protecting underrepresented interests. When one side appeals
to the canon, judges must wrestle with whether the law is sufficiently clear to work
a result against those interests.
C. Contra Proferentem in the Interpretation of Contracts
In contract law, the contra proferentem rule provides that ambiguous provisions should be construed against the contract’s drafter. As formulated in the Second Restatement of Contracts: “In choosing among the reasonable meanings of a
promise or agreement or a term thereof, that meaning is generally preferred which
operates against the party who supplies the words or from whom a writing otherwise proceeds.”80
Although this rule has to do with the interpretation of contracts, rather than
statutes, the rule is similar to the canons discussed above in two significant ways.
First, the contra proferentem rule is supported by a policy choice to protect the interests of parties with less bargaining power who were not given an adequate opportunity to shape the agreement.81 Second, an efficiency-based argument sup-

77. See, e.g., Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017); see also Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505
U.S. 1003 (1992).
78. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1070.
79. David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court’s Pursuit of States’ Rights, ColorBlind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267, 280 (2001). Getches argued that these results in
Indian law cases were explained by dominant trends toward states’ rights, away from protection of the
rights of racial minorities, and toward protection of “mainstream values,” all of which led the Court to ignore
or brush aside long-standing precedents and principles in Indian law. Id. at 268–69.
80. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
81. See DirecTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 475–76 (2015) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (referring to “the rule that ambiguous language should be construed against the drafter” and arguing that it
should have been used in the case to favor satellite TV customers).
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ports the rule as an incentive for clarity in articulating contracts—much as the canons in criminal and Indian law look toward a clear statement by the legislative
branch.82
Environmental and natural resource laws are, in a sense, “contracts” that govern society’s interactions with the environment (i.e., what can be released into the
environment, as well as what can be taken out of it). Laws that impact the environment also represent a “contract” between present generations and future generations that will depend on the same resources and ecosystem services. 83
Contract law also embraces the notion of default rules or background principles that kick in when an agreement is silent or when circumstances occur that the
parties did not think to consider in their negotiation. 84 The common law maxim in
property law, sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, provides that property should not
be used so as to injure that of another.85 Borrowing from Aldo Leopold’s land ethic
as well, the default normative rule is that one should not act in a way that tends to
harm the ecological integrity of the environment. 86 Taken together, these provide
a default presumption in contracts between society and the environment that one
may not take actions that create a negative external impact on the environment or
that create a foreseeable negative impact on future generations.
Earth’s ecosystems, of course, have no opportunity to shape or provide input
to these sorts of actions, and neither do future generations, beyond what interests
are represented by people today who are concerned about these impacts. Therefore, the same values that promote the contra preferentem rule animate the idea
that statutes permitting environmental impacts (even in the language of limiting or
restricting environmental harms) should be read with caution; and where there is
ambiguity, with a preference for interpretations that limit human impacts and preserve ecological integrity and the interests of generations to come.
D. Carolene Footnote Four Groups
The famous fourth footnote from United States v. Carolene Products Co. (“Carolene Products”)87 stands for the proposition that judges should examine statutes
differently if they affect “certain groups that cannot participate effectively in the

82.Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §206 cmt. a (observing that the drafter of a contract is
“more likely than the other party to have reason to know of uncertainties of meaning[,]” and therefore that
the rule incentivizes the drafter to use clear terms).
83. See generally EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW,
COMMON PATRIMONY, AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY (Richard Falk et al. eds., 1989) (on responsibilities to future generations); MARY CHRISTINA WOOD, NATURE’S TRUST: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR A NEW ECOLOGICAL AGE (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2014) (on trust-like responsibilities more broadly with regard to the environment).
84. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 87 (1989).
85. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387–88 (1926) (noting this principle and
nuisance law in support of zoning restrictions).
86. See ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC 201–26 (Oxford Univ. Press, 1968).
87. U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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political process.”88 The reasoning behind that approach, which has significantly influenced thinking about judicial review, is that judges must play a role in preserving
the due process and equal protection rights of “discrete and insular minorities.” 89
In the context of statutory interpretation, Eskridge and Frickey described how
the Supreme Court has favored interpretations offering greater protection to Carolene groups’ interests.90 This is done, in part, in connection with the canon of constitutional avoidance: construing a statute in favor of a suspect classification averts
the need to review its constitutional validity under a higher level of scrutiny.91
Environmental interests and rights related to the environment are not “minority” interests in the sense of protected Carolene groups, although protected
classes, such as racial minorities, do bear disproportionate environmental burdens.92 However, the process-based justification—that such classifications are not
adequately protected by the usual political process—translates quite well to matters of environmental protection and the enjoyment of human rights related to the
environment.
Environmental pollution is often cited as an example of market failure because
the social costs associated with environmentally damaging activities are often
shouldered by individuals, communities, and generations that do not share equitably in the economic or social benefits from those activities. 93 Negative environmental externalities, if left uncorrected, lead to inequitable and inefficient results for
social welfare. Environmental harms, however, also result from “government failure” in multiple ways. Asymmetries between the diffuse, common benefits of ecosystem services (clean air, clean water, etc.) and concentrated economic benefits
of environmentally damaging activities can distort legislative policy priorities and
outcomes.94 Agency “capture” in environmental policymaking at the federal, state,
or local level can also lead to socially undesirable outcomes. 95 Political processes,
for these reasons, may not adequately consider the environmental impacts of legislation.
A rule of liberal construction in favor of Carolene groups provides a buffer of
protection for interests that the usual political process will not adequately safe-

88. Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Carolene Products Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1087, 1089 (1982). See also
Felix Gilman, Famous Footnote Four: A History of the Carolene Products Footnote, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 163, 174
(2004) (regarding the “political process model” of judicial review and the Carolene footnote).
89. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
90. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 9, at 602–03 (describing the substantive canon of “[l]iberal
[c]onstruction of [s]tatutes to [p]rotect Carolene [g]roups,” with examples of cases related to African Americans, Native Americans, noncitizens, etc.).
91. See id.
92. See generally LeRoy C. Paddock, Environmental Justice, in 2 DECISION MAKING IN ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW, ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 357 (LeRoy C. Paddock et al. eds., 2016).
93. See generally Daniel C. Esty, Toward Optimal Environmental Governance, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1495, 1503–08 (1999) (discussing market failures as a cause of environmental harms).
94. See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 6, 28
(1991) (discussing the insights of public choice theory for understanding the provision of environmental
“public goods” and how laws can be distorted to benefit discrete economic groups at the expense of the
public).
95. See generally Martin Lodge, Regulatory Capture Recaptured, 74 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 539, 539–
42 (2014).
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guard. To the extent that the environment and future generations suffer from government failures, the same underlying value supports an environmental canon of
construction.
E. Broad Interpretation of Public Welfare Statutes and Statutes with a Remedial
Purpose
A further example that may guide judicial interpretation of environmental
statutes is the general rule of liberal construction of laws intended to promote the
public welfare or that have a “remedial purpose.”96 This canon bolsters claims for a
strong purposivist interpretation of environmental statutes, particularly where
their overall purpose is clearly tied to public health. Although courts have not widely
relied on the remedial purpose canon in reading most major environmental statutes—such as the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act—the canon does have a history
of application to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA), which regulates hazardous waste. 97
Closely related to this canon on public welfare and remedial statutes is a doctrine that originated in English courts, known as the “equity of the statute.”98 Under
this doctrine, judges look to the reasoning or purpose underlying a statute, and will
apply its logic and terms to cases that do not fall within the statute’s express language, but are within the statute’s purpose—consistent with the spirit of the law.99
Although the doctrine is not commonly cited in modern U.S. courts, Llewellyn, in his
“thrust and parry” list of canons, included the similar maxim that “[t]o effect its
purpose a statute may be implemented beyond its text[]” as the counterweight to
the charge that “[a] statute cannot go beyond its text.”100
The significance of this canon is its suggestion that a statute’s public purpose
can be a legitimate and appropriate source of authority for judges to rely on. When
it comes to statutes traditionally considered part of “environmental law,” judicial
employment of an environmental canon of construction would look, in practice,
nearly identical to a strong purposivist reading based on the remedial purposes

96. See Joel A. Mintz, Can You Reach New “Greens” if You Swing Old “Clubs”? Underutilized Principles of Statutory Interpretation and their Potential Applicability in Environmental Cases, 7 ENVTL. L. 295,
302–08 (2001).
97. See id. at 304 n.28 (citing a multitude of federal district court opinions employing the remedial purpose canon in CERCLA cases); see also Blake A. Watson, Liberal Construction of CERCLA Under the
Remedial Purpose Canon: Have the Lower Courts Taken a Good Thing Too Far?, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 199
(1996).
98. See Mintz, supra note 96, at 308–14. But see John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of
the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8 (2001) (arguing that calls for the equity of the statute doctrine in the
United States fail because of differences in the U.S. Constitution’s separation of powers and defined role of
the judiciary within the overall governmental structure, as compared with English common law traditions).
99. See Mintz, supra note 96, at 308; Manning, supra note 98, at 22. Manning, as a critic of scholars who have pushed for the use of the “equity of the statute” doctrine in the United States, characterizes
the doctrine as a departure from the “faithful agent” theory of statutory interpretation. Id. Yet the doctrine’s
focus on purpose suggests that it is not a rejection of the analogy of courts as agents of Congress; rather, it
is a deep division in the scope of judicial prerogative in ascertaining and defining the will of Congress.
100. Llewellyn, supra note 11, at 401.
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canon.101 Of course, the environmental canon of construction that has been described above is broader. It applies beyond a specific set of statutes to any federal
law with the potential to significantly affect environmental interests.
F. Environmental Interests as Public Values
The five examples above illustrate the ways in which certain common underlying public values with regard to the law influence statutory interpretation. The
rule of lenity, Indian canons of construction, and recognition of Carolene groups all
point toward a substantive preference—when interpreting ambiguous statutes—
toward interpretations that protect vulnerable or underrepresented interests. Contract law’s interpretative rules suggest, by analogy, the same principle in safeguarding vulnerable interests when construing legal instruments. Rules of broad construction for statutes with a purpose of promoting public welfare or remedying
harms to the public point toward the legitimacy of weighing public values in judicial
decision-making.
Environmental interests—speaking both of concern over threats to ecological
integrity per se, as well as to anthropocentric rights and interests that depend on a
healthy, functioning environment—deserve similar protection. Decisions and policy
choices we make today may affect the wellbeing, rights, and opportunities of present and future generations in ways that cannot be easily reversed. 102 The precautionary principle in environmental law and policy, recognized at the international
level in the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, reflects this
concern.103 Twenty-five years after the Rio Declaration, however, environmental
law in the United States remains stagnant. While our understanding of climate
change, air pollution, species extinctions, and other environmental crises has
changed, the core legal framework for addressing these concerns has not104—and
continued environmental degradation highlights the degree to which the interests
of current and future generations in an ecologically sustainable environment are
vulnerable and underrepresented in the legislative process.
An environmental canon of construction cannot, of course, address all of the
legal system’s challenges in dealing with relationship between humans and the environment. But a canon of construction is justified because it will serve important
public interests in a manner similar to other substantive canons. As shown further
in the next section, environmental principles in interpreting statutes are, in fact,
101. In these cases, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) bolsters the statute-specific remedial purpose canon by calling for interpretation of all statutes in a manner consistent with NEPA’s environmental policies. See infra Part III.
102. See generally WEISS, supra note 83 (on responsibilities to future generations); WOOD, supra
note 83 (on trust-like responsibilities more broadly with regard to the environment).
103. U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, princ. 15, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I), agenda 21 (June 1992) (“In order to protect the
environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities.
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used
as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.”).
104. For example, the Clean Air Act was last amended in 1990, and the last major changes to the
Clean Water Act were in 1987. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990);
Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7 (1987).
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what Congress has also compelled: a requirement that judges interpret the law in a
manner that promotes environmental sustainability. 105
III. NEPA’S MANDATE FOR AN ENVIRONMENTAL CANON OF CONSTRUCTION
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 106 signed by President Nixon in
1970, transformed U.S. law by laying out a policy “to create and maintain conditions
under which [humans] and nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the
social, economic, and other requirements of present and future generations of
Americans.”107 NEPA has been a touchstone of environmental law in the United
States for nearly fifty years. As one of the first major environmental statutes, it fundamentally altered federal decision-making. NEPA is best known for its provisions
on environmental impact assessment. It requires “all agencies of the Federal Government” to study and disclose in an environmental impact statement (EIS) the impacts (and alternatives) for all proposed “major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment . . . .”108
Environmental impact assessment is a key element of an environmental policy; it requires government actors to consider environmental values in their decision-making process, alongside other objectives in designing and refining policy.
NEPA’s requirement, along with the implementing regulations developed by the
Council on Environmental Quality109 that flesh out how agencies conduct these assessments, has served as a pattern for states and for many countries throughout
the world.110 Courts have generally characterized NEPA’s environmental impact assessment provision as a procedural requirement. 111 It requires agencies to carry out
the process thoroughly and in good faith to understand the expected environmental impacts of proposed projects and alternatives, but does not, courts have concluded (or at least assumed), mandate a substantive level of environmental quality
that must be met for a proposed activity to go forward. 112 By 1989, the Supreme
105. See infra Part III (analyzing Section 102(1) of the National Environmental Policy Act).
106. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370h (2012)).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (2012).
108. § 4332(2)(C).
109. 40 C.F.R. pts. 1500–1508 (2018).
110. See U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, princ. 17, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I), agenda 21 (June 1992) (calling on countries to
undertake environmental impact assessment “for proposed activities that are likely to have a significant
adverse impact on the environment and are subject to a decision of a competent national authority”). In
Brazil, for example, the country’s Constitution, adopted in 1988, requires environmental impact assessment
prior to “activities which may potentially cause significant degradation of the environment.” CONSTITUIÇÅO
FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 225 § 4 (Braz.)
111. See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 449 F.2d
1109, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (“[NEPA] leaves room for a responsible exercise of discretion and may not require particular substantive results in particular problematic instances. However, the Act also contains very
important ‘procedural’ provisions—provisions which are designed to see that all federal agencies do in fact
exercise the substantive discretion given them.”).
112. Id.; see generally Daniel R. Mandelker, The National Environmental Policy Act: A Review of Its
Experience and Problems, 32 WASH. U.J.L. & POL’Y 293 (2010). Sam Kalen has laid out the legislative history
of NEPA in detail, concluding that Congress intended a more significant substantive mandate to shape policy
toward environmental protection, and stating the case that the assumption by early courts and subsequent
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Court stated that “it is now well settled that NEPA itself does not mandate particular
results, but simply prescribes the necessary process[,]” and that “NEPA merely prohibits uninformed—rather than unwise—agency action.”113
Despite the importance of the EIS in environmental decision-making, much of
NEPA’s promise remains unfulfilled.114 Earlier in the statute, NEPA provides not only
a statement of principles that make up a national environmental policy, but also a
far-reaching principle of interpretation.115 Section 102 of NEPA—the same section
that gives rise to the EIS—begins with the following first clause and subsection: “The
Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible: (1) the policies,
regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be interpreted and administered in accordance with the policies set forth in this [Act.]”116 As Joel Mintz has
noted, this provision, despite its clarity, has largely been ignored by both lawyers
and judges.117
The “policies” referred to in Section 102(1) are found in the previous section.
Section 101 makes it
the continuing policy of the Federal Government, in cooperation
with State and local governments, and other concerned public and
private organizations, to use all practicable means and measures,
including financial and technical assistance, in a manner calculated
to foster and promote the general welfare, to create and maintain
conditions under which [humans] and nature can exist in productive
harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements
of present and future generations of Americans.118
Subsections (b) and (c) give further instructions about how this policy is to be
implemented:
(b) In order to carry out the policy set forth in this chapter, it is the
continuing responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable means, consistent with other essential considerations of national policy, to improve and coordinate Federal plans, functions,
programs, and resources to the end that the Nation may(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the
environment for succeeding generations;

commentators that NEPA only requires procedural compliance is indeed only an assumption. See Sam Kalen,
Ecology Comes of Age: NEPA’s Lost Mandate, 21 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 113, 116–17 (2010).
113. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350–51 (1989).
114. See generally Kalen, supra note 112.
115. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331–4332 (2012).
116. § 4332(1).
117. Joel A. Mintz, Taking Congress’s Words Seriously: Towards a Sound Construction of NEPA’s
Long Overlooked Interpretation Mandate, 38 ENVTL. L. 1031, 1051 (2008). In over four decades of NEPA
history, only six published judicial opinions had directly applied this section, and did so only in the context
of administrative agency interpretation, rather than judicial interpretation. See id. at 1037–41. One Ninth
Circuit case in 2003 quoted it, but its treatment of the provision was also limited. See Ctr. for Biological
Diversity v. U.S. Forest Serv., 349 F.3d 1157, 1166 (9th Cir. 2003).
118. § 4331(a) (emphasis added).
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(2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and aesthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings;
(3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment
without degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable
and unintended consequences;
(4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our
national heritage, and maintain, wherever possible, an environment which supports diversity and variety of individual choice;
(5) achieve a balance between population and resource use which
will permit high standards of living and a wide sharing of life's
amenities; and
(6) enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the
maximum attainable recycling of depletable resources.
(c) The Congress recognizes that each person should enjoy a healthful
environment and that each person has a responsibility to contribute
to the preservation and enhancement of the environment. 119
Key legislators involved in drafting NEPA indicated that this lengthy list of policies was intended to transform federal policy by requiring “substantive attention”
to be given to environmental matters.120 Notably, Section 101(c) includes language
regarding a human right to a healthful environment, a right since guaranteed in the
constitutions of several dozen countries, as well as several U.S. states. 121 Even
though NEPA does not list this or other concepts in terms of substantive rights, they
are clearly stated as policy considerations that must be supported through “interpret[ation] and administ[ration]” of “the policies, regulations, and public laws of the
United States[.]”122
Notwithstanding the text of Section 102(1) and its “interpretation” mandate,
very few court decisions have applied this subsection. NEPA-related litigation and
judicial decisions have instead been subsumed by implementation of the environmental impact assessment requirement. 123 In 2008, Mintz examined the judicial application of the provision, noting that courts had only addressed it in six reported
opinions—all from the 1970s—and none had directly analyzed the question of how
NEPA should influence judicial statutory interpretation generally (as opposed to
agency interpretations or implementation of NEPA).124
One issue in understanding the effect of NEPA’s Section 102(1) is which
branch(es) of government must follow the mandate to “interpret” laws, policies,
119. § 4331(b)–(c).
120. See Kalen, supra note 112, at 142–43 (citing statements from Senator Jackson and revisions
made at the committee level in the Senate).
121. See, e.g., Nicholas Bryner, A Constitutional Human Right to a Healthy Environment, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 168 (Douglas Edgar Fisher ed., 2016)
(discussing and comparing examples of constitutional environmental human rights).
122. § 4332(1) (emphasis added).
123. See Mintz, supra note 117.
124. See id. at 1032. A more recent case, decided by the Ninth Circuit in 2003, quoted Section
102(1), but referred to it only in the context of “strictly interpret[ing]” “[t]he procedures prescribed both in
NEPA and [its] implementing regulations . . . ‘to the fullest extent possible’ in accord with the policies embodied in the Act.” Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Forest Serv., 349 F.3d 1157, 1166 (9th Cir. 2003).
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and regulations in accordance with environmental policies: does it apply to administrative agencies, courts, or both? Mintz’s review of the legislative history of NEPA
provides no conclusive answer to this question. Most of the debate that exists in
the public record was focused on the extent to which federal agencies would be
forced to implement the Act.125 However, there is no textual indication that Section
102(1) is limited only to agency interpretations. Section 102(2) specifically targets
agencies, beginning with “all agencies of the Federal Government shall . . . .” 126 Section 102(1) contains no such language.127 Without it, the most natural way to read
Section 102(1)’s charge that “the policies, regulations, and public laws of the United
States shall be interpreted and administered in accordance with” NEPA’s policies,128
therefore, is that it “applies to all governmental entities in all branches of the federal government that are responsible for the interpretation as well as the administration of our nation’s policies, regulations, and public laws.” 129
In the six cases that grapple with this provision, courts have generally examined it only in the context of agency interpretation and implementation. 130 These
cases led to mixed results. In two cases, federal courts cited Section 102(1) in holding that certain activities of the Department of Transportation and the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, respectively, were indeed subject to the NEPA environmental
impact statement requirement.131 A third court quoted Section 102(1) in reference
to the Secretary of the Interior’s interpretation of a federal statute (the Helium Act),
noting then that if “the Secretary interpreted the objectives of the [statute] in an
erroneous or unnecessarily restrictive manner, his action would be contrary to not
only [that statute], but NEPA as well; the statutes themselves clearly provide ‘law
to apply.’”132 Two other cases rejected litigants’ claims that Section 102(1) should
be used to interpret other statutes together with NEPA—the Revenue Sharing Act
and the statute that created the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency—in a way that
would make environmental impact statements necessary for the agencies involved.133
A final 1970s case addressing Section 102(1) involved the Department of the
Interior’s implementation of the Mineral Leasing Act. 134 The petitioners had argued
that NEPA required the Bureau of Land Management to interpret the Mineral Leasing Act to give the agency discretion to deny a coal lease application to a permittee
125. See Mintz, supra note 117, at 1033–35.
126. § 4332(2).
127. See § 4332(1).
128. Id.
129. Mintz, supra note 117, at 1037.
130. See id. at 1038–41.
131. See Arlington Coal. on Transp. v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1973) (NEPA applied to U.S.
Department of Transportation for highway project proposal); Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D.
Tex. 1973), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Sierra Club v. Callaway, 499 F.2d 982 (5th Cir. 1974). These
cases are discussed in Mintz, supra note 117, at 1038–39.
132. Nat’l Helium Corp. v. Morton, 361 F. Supp. 78, 92 (D. Kan.), rev’d on other grounds, 486 F.2d
995 (10th Cir. 1973); see Mintz, supra note 117, at 1038.
133. Carolina Action v. Simon, 389 F. Supp. 1244 (M.D.N.C. 1975), aff’d, 522 F.2d 295 (4th Cir.
1975) (holding that the Department of the Treasury did not need to prepare an EIS for distribution of funds
to local governments); California v. S. Lake Tahoe, 466 F. Supp. 527 (E.D. Cal. 1978) (EIS not required for
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency’s road project).
134. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Berklund, 609 F.2d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1979).

24

IDAHO LAW REVIEW

VOL. 54

that had otherwise met the statutory criterion of discovering “commercial quantities” of coal.135 The D.C. Circuit held that NEPA did not override the “plain meaning”
of the Mineral Leasing Act and a consistent history of agency practice. 136
These few cases give some added shape to judicial review of agency implementation of NEPA and of the interpretation of various statutory mandates in light
of NEPA’s environmental impact statement requirements. Yet courts have not approached the more general question of whether and how the language provides
guidance on judicial statutory interpretation.
Despite interpretations of NEPA as a statute with procedural, rather than substantive mandates, the statute provides clear direction to judges in support of an
environmental canon of construction. Pursuant to the policy given in NEPA, whenever possible, statutes must be read in a manner that best promotes environmental
sustainability and does not compromise the interests of future generations. There
is no qualifier as to whom Section 102(1) of the statute applies; therefore, NEPA’s
directive—that regulations, laws, and public laws of the United States be interpreted according to the environmental policies listed—should guide judges in their
work.
NEPA requires this interpretation to be done “to the fullest extent possible[,]”137 a phrase consistent with the notion that ambiguous statutes should be
read in a manner that tends to favor ecological integrity and human health. As Mintz
points out, there is a well-developed line of jurisprudence on the phrase “to the
fullest extent possible” that qualifies all of Section 102—both the interpretation and
administration mandate as well as the environmental impact assessment requirement.138 This interpretative principle, limited to the “possible,” does not ask courts
to alter the plain meaning of statutes, but rather compels the consideration of environmental policies in weighing competing possible interpretations. 139 Again, the
environmental canon of construction I have proposed does not mandate a substantive measure of environmental quality, but rather requires legal and linguistic clarity
if a statute or regulation is to be applied in a way that potentially harms environmental interests and the interests of future generations.
No court has directly applied NEPA’s Section 102(1) to its own process for statutory interpretation in a particular case. However, NEPA’s interpretive mandate is
a clear congressional expression for an environmental canon of construction. NEPA
provides significant evidence of the presence of public environmental values consonant with the other values that substantive canons of construction reinforce. The
value of environmental sustainability for present and future generations supports a
substantive preference in statutory cases toward an interpretation that best protects environmental interests.
The justification for doing so is rooted in principles that are familiar throughout the U.S. legal system. As shown further in the next section, such a shift in judicial

135. See id. at 558.
136. See id.
137. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2012).
138. See Mintz, supra note 117, at 1041–44.
139. See id.
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reasoning to accommodate environmental concerns has precedent in other U.S. legal doctrines and in examples of pro-environment statutory construction principles
in other countries.
IV. SHIFTS IN LEGAL DOCTRINE TO ENGAGE WITH ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS:
PRECEDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND ELSEWHERE
An environmental canon of construction calls for the interpretation of ambiguous statutes in a manner that is most likely to afford the greatest protection of
ecological integrity and human health. Justified by the text of NEPA and on the
grounds that the judiciary ought to safeguard vulnerable interests, this canon would
apply to any law with the potential to negatively impact the environment, even
where the statute at issue does not itself describe a clear environmental purpose. 140
This ecological theory of statutory interpretation marks a shift in legal doctrine. Yet this sort of transformation in legal reasoning is not unprecedented; examples in U.S. law and in comparative law contexts demonstrate how legal paradigms
have changed to engage with environmental challenges. The line of judicial decisions on standing and access to judicial review for parties representing environmental interests portrays an analogous process, where environmental consciousness altered legal doctrine in ways that might have previously seemed unlikely. As comparative examples, the principle in dubio pro natura—when in doubt, decide in favor of nature—has reshaped statutory interpretation, and the recognition of an
ecological function of property has redefined traditional thinking about property
rights. These experiences provide a pattern to show how an environmental canon
of construction can be incorporated into U.S. law.
A. Changing Doctrines of Standing
Before the modern era of environmental law that began in the mid-twentiethcentury, judicial application of environmental norms was done largely as a matter
of private law.141 Nuisance law provided judicial redress against substantial and unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of property, but the ability to
bring a claim was limited to those neighbors with recognized property interests.142

140. This point is critical, especially given that the major environmental statutes in the United
States stand unchanged in nearly three decades since the Clean Air Act was last amended in 1990. See Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990). While the main pillars have stood
in place, scientific understanding of environmental issues has evolved significantly, and environmental issues are ever more commonly regulated by laws “outside the canon” of environmental law, and as a part
of larger, non-environmental programs spread across different government agencies. See Todd S. Aagaard,
Environmental Law Outside the Canon, 89 IND. L.J. 1239 (2014).
141. See, e.g., Karen Morrow, The Courts, Nuisance and Environmental Pollution—A Matter of
Will?, in 2 DECISION MAKING IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 52, 56 (LeRoy C.
Paddock et al., eds. 2016).
142. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (“One is subject to liability for a
private nuisance if, but only if, his conduct is a legal cause of an invasion of another’s interest in the private
use and enjoyment of land, and the invasion is either (a) intentional and unreasonable, or (b) unintentional
and otherwise actionable under the rules controlling liability for negligent or reckless conduct, or for abnormally dangerous conditions or activities.”).
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Public nuisance changed this dynamic, providing a vehicle for addressing
harms to rights “common to the general public.” 143 In an increasingly complex and
industrialized world, this widened the scope of judicial process, affording an opportunity to deal with environmental harms such as air pollution that affects the public
in ways not protected by the enforcement of traditional property rights.144 In Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., the state of Georgia brought a suit in equity against a
private entity—in Tennessee—seeking to stop air pollution that was causing damage across state lines in Georgia.145 The Supreme Court noted the novelty of the
case, observing that the “elements that would be relied upon in a suit between fellow-citizens as a ground for equitable relief” were lacking; for example, the state
did not own title to much of the affected land. 146 Justice Holmes, writing for the
Court, sustained Georgia’s ability to bring the case, in defense of the environmental
interests of its residents, “in its capacity of quasi-sovereign.”147
With the spread of environmental calamities and the enactment of significant
new environmental statutes came accompanying questions of standing and justiciability. Who would have access to the courts to enforce environmental standards
and regulations, and who may seek to compel administrative action required by
law? The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in the 1940s had, by this time, already
opened up judicial review of administrative actions to a wider range of cases. 148
In Sierra Club v. Morton, the Sierra Club sought the ability to bring a challenge
against federal agencies regarding permits for a ski resort and recreation area
planned by Walt Disney Enterprises in the Mineral King Valley of California. 149 The
Supreme Court noted in that case that economic interests had been recognized as
grounds for standing in the context of administrative agency actions.150 The Court
dismissed the Sierra Club’s case for lack of standing, holding that the organization
had failed to demonstrate injury to any of its individual members—a mere interest
in a problem was not enough for an organization to make its way into the courthouse.151 However, the Court also stated that it did not question that aesthetic and
environmental concerns—if demonstrated by any of the organization’s individual
members—could be “sufficient to lay the basis for standing.”152
The Sierra Club v. Morton Court opened the door widely to consideration of
environmental interests as a legitimate stake in the outcome of a case, reasoning
that “the fact that particular environmental interests are shared by the many rather
than the few does not make them less deserving of legal protection through the

143. § 821B.
144. See, e.g., Morrow, supra note 141, at 52, 53.
145. See Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
146. Id. at 237.
147. Id.
148. See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012).
149. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 728–30 (1972). On this and other key environmental
standing cases, see Bradford C. Mank, Standing and Related Doctrines, in 2 DECISION MAKING IN ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW, ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 386 (LeRoy C. Paddock et al., eds. 2016).
150. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 733–34 (citing Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150 (1970)).
151. See id. at 739.
152. Id. at 734.
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judicial process.”153 Justice Douglas’s famous dissent argued for a more complete
revolution, with legal rights of standing held by natural ecosystems themselves. 154
Nonetheless, the majority’s opinion sowed the seeds for a legal shift in doctrine
toward standing rooted in non-economic harms, based on greater consciousness of
the role of “environmental well-being [as an] important ingredient[] of the quality
of life in our society.”155
Although the Court later circumscribed standing in environmental cases, 156
the principle of liberal standing for claims related to environmental, aesthetic, and
public health concerns remained, at least in the views of a majority of Justices. 157 In
Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court also allowed a wider assertion of standing
for the state of Massachusetts as a sovereign entity with regard to potential harms
from climate change.158 In Massachusetts, the Court was faced with the scenario of
the most complex environmental problem—climate change—and applied the doctrine at its disposal, if not to compel specific substantive government action, at least
to prevent inaction.159
The doctrine of standing, as an example, suggests how judicial reasoning
about what constitutes a proper, justiciable case, and how judges approach questions involving environmental matters can change over time. The principle of interpretation called for in NEPA is not a radical departure from this phenomenon. Increasingly, we are becoming aware of how much we are a part of, and not separate
from, the environment around us. As our society gains greater understanding of
how our economic, social, and cultural foundations are tied to the environment and
to ecological functions, the role for environmental considerations in judging the implication of statutes becomes easier to see. These principles point to the underlying
values that support a substantive environmental canon of construction.
B. Lessons from Comparative Law
In many parts of the world, environmental issues are at the forefront of legal
reforms.160 National constitutions, regional agreements, and international negotiations point to the importance of environmental law. The international community,
in particular, has taken several important steps in the past few years to reshape
traditional legal doctrines to accommodate environmental interests. 161 The UN’s
Sustainable Development Goals, adopted in 2015 as the successors to the Millennium Development Goals,162 have raised the profile of environmental concerns in
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id.
Id. at 741–55 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 734.
See Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488 (2009); Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555

(1992).
157. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
158. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518–20 (2007). The Court quoted from Justice Holmes’
opinion in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper to support this holding. See id. at 518–19 (quoting Georgia v. Tenn.
Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907)).
159. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 534–35.
160. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 70/1 (Oct. 21, 2015).
161. See, e.g., id.
162. Id. at 1.
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international thinking about development and the rule of law. In 2016, the IUCN
World Declaration on Environmental Rule of Law affirmed that “[s]trenghtening the
rule of law is critical to protecting environmental, social, and cultural values and to
achieving ecologically sustainable development[.]”163 The Declaration lays out principles for integrating environmental values into the legal system, calling for recognition of both environmental rights and obligations.164
Although legal traditions in each country differ, 165 various nations’ courts have
put these principles in practice. As illustrated below, the application of the in dubio
pro natura principle and the doctrine of the ecological function of property rights
are examples of significant shifts in legal doctrines. These changes are instructive as
patterns for how U.S. courts can implement an environmental canon of construction.
U.S. environmental law developed quickly in the late 1960s and 1970s and has
served as a model for similar programs in other countries.166 Since that time, most
countries have taken a more fundamental approach to incorporating environmental issues into their legal systems by constitutionalizing environmental norms. 167 A
“right to a decent environment” has, on many occasions since 1970, been introduced in Congress as a constitutional amendment, but never successfully proposed
to the states for ratification.168 However, over the past thirty years, nearly every
country that has rewritten its constitution has adopted some form of specified right
to a healthy environment or to environmental protection. The constitutions of
ninety-two countries worldwide—and several U.S. states—provide for such a
right.169
With this backdrop of constitutional environmental rights, courts in several
countries have developed and applied a pro-nature interpretation of statutes under
the principle in dubio pro natura (when in doubt, in favor of nature).170 In dubio pro

163. IUCN WORLD DECLARATION ON THE ENVIRONMENTAL RULE OF LAW, INT'L UNION FOR CONSERVATION
NATURE
2
(2016),
https://www.iucn.org/sites/dev/files/content/documents/world_declaration_on_the_environmental_rule_of_law_final_2017-3-17.pdf.
164. See id. at 3 (on the “Obligation to Protect Nature” and the “Right to Nature and Rights of
Nature”).
165. Common law and civil law traditions differ as to the role of the judge in interpreting the law,
for example. But as codified law has spread in the United States since the country’s inception, common law
judges in the United States have taken on a much greater degree of the civil law judge’s function.
166. See Where EPA Works Around the World, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/international-cooperation/where-epa-works-around-world/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2017) (describing cooperative programs between the United States and other countries on developing institutions for environmental
protection).
167. See, e.g., Z. Ntozintle Jobodwana, Integrating International Environmental Principles and
Norms into the South African Legal System and Policies, US-China L. Rev. 701, 702–03 (2011).
168. E.g., H.R.J. Res. 1321, 90th Cong. (1968).
169. See generally Toronto Initiative for Economic and Social Rights, TEISR.ORG,
http://www.tiesr.org/data.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2018). The database includes constitutions and amendments up to April 2014. For more on the role of constitutional environmental rights, see generally DAVID R.
BOYD, THE ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS REVOLUTION: A GLOBAL STUDY OF CONSTITUTIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT (2012).
170. See Nicholas S. Bryner, In Dubio Pro Natura: A Principle for Strengthening Environmental Rule
of Law, 78 REVISTA DE DIREITO AMBIENTAL 245 (2015) (Braz.); Nicholas A. Robinson, Fundamental Principles of
Law for the Anthropocene?, 44/1-2 ENVTL. POL’Y & L. 13, 16 (2014); ASSOCIAÇÃO BRASILEIRA DE MAGISTRADOS
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natura is an expansive concept that guides decisionmaking and provides a resolution for legal uncertainty in matters affecting the environment.171
One concrete judicial application of in dubio pro natura has been in statutory
interpretation. Article 395 of Ecuador’s Constitution of 2008, for example, includes
the following charge: “In case of uncertainty regarding the reach of legal provisions
on environmental matters, such provisions shall be applied in the sense most favorable to the protection of nature.”172 In a legal system that regards the constitution
as the highest point in the hierarchy of sources of law, such an explicit call for judges
to interpret environmental laws carries enormous weight. In Brazil,173 Costa Rica,174
Indonesia,175 and Pakistan,176 courts have employed the principle to construe statutes in favor of interpretations that promote ecological integrity.
As an additional illustration of shifts in legal doctrines, countries in Latin America, especially Brazil, have demonstrated how environmental values can shape traditional notions of property law. In many legal systems in the region, property law
has long been tempered by the doctrine of the social function of property.177 Property, though individually owned, must fulfill its social function; the public retains an
interest in how property is utilized, in order to ensure productivity and counterbalance tendencies toward concentration of land ownership. In Brazil, courts have examined the constitutional provisions on environmental rights and on property to
synthesize an ecological function of property.178 In short, the recognition of environmental values redefined legal thinking about the limitations of property rights—
recognizing a public interest in the ecosystem services and ecological attributes of
private land, with a corresponding obligation for landowners to refrain from activities that would damage those interests.179
Four of the countries mentioned above have a constitutionally guaranteed
right to enjoy a healthy environment. 180 In the other, Pakistan, courts have concluded that constitutional rights to life and human dignity include a right to a
healthy environment.181 Indeed, because the majority of the world’s constitutions
[BRAZILIAN ASSOCIATION OF JUDGES], ANAIS DO I ENCONTRO INTERNACIONAL DE DIREITO AMBIENTAL: IN DUBIO PRO NATURA
(2013) (Braz.).
171. See id.
172. CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA DEL ECUADOR, Art. 395, ¶ 4 (author translation).
173. E.g., S.T.J., REsp 1.145.083/MG, 2010/0111349-9, Relator: Min. Herman Benjamin,
04.09.2012.
174. Corte Suprema de Justicia de Costa Rica, Sala Constitucional, Sentencia 5893, 27.10.1995.
175. Nirarta Samadhi, Preserving Papua’s Forests, WRI INDON. (Sept. 30, 2017), http://www.wriindonesia.org/en/blog/preserving-papuas-forests.
176. Maple Leaf Cement Factory v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Case No. W.P. No. 115949/2017 (Lahore
High Court, Pakistan, Dec. 21, 2017).
177. See Nicholas S. Bryner, Public Interests and Private Land: The Ecological Function of Property
in Brazil, 34 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 122, 126 (2016).
178. See id. at 125.
179. See id.
180. CONSTITUIÇÅO FEDERAL [C.F.] {CONSTITUTION] art. 225 (Braz.); CONSTITUTION OF COSTA RICA revised
2011, art. 50; CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ECUADOR OCT. 20, 2008, art. 14; 1945 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC
OF INDONESIA, amended 2002, art. 28H.
181. See, e.g., Taimur Khan, Environmental Protection Under Law in Pakistan,
FUTUREOFENVIRONMENTALLAW
(Aug.
23,
2015),
https://nextgenenvironmentallaw.wordpress.com/2015/08/23/environment-protection-under-law-in-pakistan/.
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have been written in the past thirty years,182 the interpretation of constitutional
provisions is likely to be much more significant in such countries in driving reforms,
changes, and new practices in legal systems. The new constitutions are both
broader in terms of the subject matter that they address and more specific in resolving particular issues. The constitutional environmental right in the countries
cited above makes it easy to trace a line to a substantive canon of statutory interpretation that favors enjoyment of the right (as well as a canon that avoids interpretations inconsistent with that constitutional provision).
These comparative perspectives shed useful light on how the in dubio pro
natura principle can be applied—especially in its particular application to methods
of statutory interpretation. However, these examples do not necessarily mean that
a constitutionally recognized environmental right is required in order to reach a pronature statutory construction in the context of U.S. law.183 Short of such an express
right, the common law and constitutional values underpinning the protection of
vulnerable interests, as well as the mandate in NEPA, justify the use of a pro-environment principle to resolve statutory ambiguities.
V. APPLYING AN ENVIRONMENTAL CANON OF CONSTRUCTION
Thus far, this article has sought to lay out the justification for an environmental canon of construction—a rule that judges should interpret statutes, when possible, in favor of a construction that tends toward ecological integrity, human health,
and long-term environmental sustainability. Many theories compete to explain (descriptively) and justify (normatively) the range of substantive canons, but one unifying factor across many of these canons is the tendency toward safeguarding vulnerable interests. To the extent that this public value—concern for the underrepresented or the powerless—animates substantive canons, the crisis of environmental
degradation and overexploitation compels us to consider whether environmental
interests are also deserving of this protection. Environmental crises threaten both
intragenerational and intergenerational justice. Process-based theory on environmental policymaking, market and government failures in environmental regulation,
and concern for the interests of future generations all give rise to the need for an
environmental canon.
Against this theoretical backdrop, NEPA’s mandate calls on courts to interpret
the law in accordance with the policy of human coexistence with nature “in productive harmony” and the fulfillment of “the social, economic, and other requirements
of present and future generations of Americans.” 184 To meet this ideal, what should
an environmental canon of construction look like in practice? This section considers
three examples from recent cases to test the contours of the idea. The examples
are chosen to draw out some of the complications in applying the canon. Statutory
182. Toronto Initiative for Economic and Social Rights, supra note 169 (database includes analysis
of 83 constitutions originally adopted in 1984 or earlier, and 112 since then).
183. In other words, a constitutional amendment adding environmental rights in the U.S. Constitution (on par with the provisions in other constitutions worldwide) would entail a reshaping of property
rights and regulatory powers, but the pro-nature principle is not reliant on this, focusing only on the modest
change of how to address the ambiguous statutory interpretation cases by adding an additional substantive
canon of construction that operates in conjunction with other such canons.
184. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (2012).
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interpretation is usually straightforward, but in the small sample of appellate cases,
it is never so simple. Principles that weigh in favor of one resolution run up against
competing values. Having an environmental canon of construction puts important
interests in a place where they may be appropriately considered; even when it does
not alter the outcome, it enhances the legitimacy of those concerns and, hopefully,
leads to a better balance.
A. Lacey Act
The Lacey Act is an old wildlife law, dating originally to 1900.185 Named after
its principal sponsor, Congressman John Lacey, the Act first came into being as a
federal backstop for state wildlife regulation. 186 In its original form, the Lacey Act
prohibited interstate trafficking in wildlife that had been taken in violation of state
laws, and also disallowed the importation of foreign wild animals or birds without
a permit.187 The Act has since been revised and expanded several times: it now addresses foreign commerce in wildlife and birds taken in violation of the laws of the
country of origin, and, since it was most recently amended in 2008, now prohibits
the importation or trafficking in plants and plant products in violation of source
country or state law.188
A related provision in the Lacey Act provided a process for federal officials
(originally the Department of Agriculture, but now the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
within the Department of the Interior) to prohibit the importation of wildlife species
deemed to be “injurious.” 189 In 1960, Congress expanded this section, now in Title
18, to proscribe:
[t]he importation into the United States, any territory of the
United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, or any possession of the United States, or any shipment between the continental United States, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or any possession of the United States . . . such [animal] species . . . which
the Secretary of the Interior may prescribe by regulation to be

185. See Lacey Act, ch. 553, 31 Stat. 187 (1900) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371–3378
(2012)).
186. Victor J. Rocco, Wildlife Conservation Under the Lacey Act: International Cooperation or Legal
Imperialism?, 80-MAY N.Y. ST. B.J. 10, 12 (2008).
187. See Lacey Act, §§ 2–3, 31 Stat. at 188.
188. See 16 U.S.C. § 3372(a)(2) (2012) (making it unlawful “to import, export, transport, sell, receive, acquire, or purchase in interstate or foreign commerce—(A) any fish or wildlife taken, possessed,
transported, or sold in violation of any law or regulation of any State or in violation of any foreign law; (B)
any plant—(i) taken, possessed, transported, or sold in violation of any law or regulation of any State, or any
foreign law, that protects plants . . . ”).
189. The language in the original Lacey Act prohibited “[t]he importation of the mongoose, the
so-called ‘flying foxes’ or fruit bats, the English sparrow, the starling, or such other birds or animals as the
Secretary of Agriculture may from time to time declare injurious to the interest of agriculture or horticulture
. . . ” Lacey Act, § 2, 31 Stat. at 188. Responsibility for overseeing this provision was transferred from the
Department of Agriculture to the Department of the Interior in 1939. Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1939, §
4(f), 53 Stat. 1431, 1433–34.
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injurious to human beings, to the interests of agriculture, horticulture, forestry, or to wildlife or the wildlife resources of the
United States[.]190
In April 2017, a panel of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals decided a case that
the U.S. Association of Reptile Keepers had brought against the Department of the
Interior, in which the court parsed the interpretation of this statutory provision. 191
In 2015, the Fish and Wildlife Service had listed several species of snakes as “injurious,” to which the import and shipment provisions of the Lacey Act would apply. 192
The government had, for some time, taken the position that the Lacey Act allowed
it to prohibit all interstate shipments of injurious species.193 The Reptile Keepers
brought suit, arguing that the language of the statute—“between the continental
United States, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,
or any possession of the United States” 194—meant that state-to-state transportation within the continental United States was not prohibited, and rather, that the
statute applied only to shipments between the continental states as a whole and
the other jurisdictions listed.195
The D.C. Circuit panel that heard the case ruled in favor of the Reptile Keepers,
holding that the statute could not be used to prohibit interstate transportation
within the continental United States.196 Remarkably, the court found the statute to
be clear and unambiguous, despite the argument that the provision could be read
multiple ways.197 The court cited style manuals to support a conclusion that “between,” as used in the statute, meant only relationships “across” the identified
items in the list, and that it said “nothing about relationships within any one of the
listed items.”198 Following this justification were a number of examples of phrases
where “between” is naturally understood in this sense. 199
The court’s finding that the statute was “clear” 200 served the purpose of simplifying its reasoning, allowing the court to skirt the applicability of other doctrines
and rules of interpretation. However, a more skeptical reading of the case shows
that the court was willing to strain quite hard in order to come up with this result;
multiple times, the court brushed aside apparent ambiguities and problems in order
to defend its conclusion that the statute had only one clear and straightforward
interpretation.
190. 18 U.S.C. § 42(a)(1) (2012). Most of this specific language was added by the Act of Sept. 2,
1960, Pub. L. 86-702, 74 Stat. 753, 753–54.
191. See U.S. Ass’n of Reptile Keepers, Inc. v. Zinke, 852 F.3d 1131 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
192. See id. at 1134 (citing Injurious Wildlife Species; Listing Three Anaconda Species and One
Python Species as Injurious Reptiles, 80 Fed. Reg. 12,702 (Mar. 10, 2015) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 16)).
193. See U.S. Ass’n of Reptile Keepers, 852 F.3d at 1133.
194. 18 U.S.C. § 42(a)(1).
195. See U.S. Ass’n of Reptile Keepers, 852 F.3d at 1132–34.
196. Id. at 1142.
197. Id. at 1138. Because the court “[saw] no ambiguity” in the statue, it did not determine
whether Chevron deference would apply in this circumstance to an agency interpretation of a criminal statute. Id.
198. Id. at 1135.
199. Id. at 1135–36.
200. Id. at 1138.
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The court rejected the federal government’s contention that this reading of
the statute would lead to absurd inconsistencies.201 For example, under the court’s
decision, the ban applies to shipments of injurious species from Virginia to Washington, D.C. (because the District of Columbia is listed separately), but not from Virginia to Maryland.202 The court reasoned that this was plausible under the theory
that Congress intended to leave it up to states to choose whether and how to protect their respective state borders from injurious species already found within the
United States—and while those states could do so, Congress sought to protect D.C.
specifically, given that this language was adopted in 1960, prior to the passage of
the Home Rule Act in 1973.203 Yet the scope of state authority to do this effectively
was not clear at the time: the D.C. Circuit cited Maine v. Taylor for this proposition,
which the Supreme Court did not decide until 1986, decades after the amendments
to the Lacey Act at issue—and in that case, the Court overturned a First Circuit decision that would have struck down a state invasive species statute as a violation of
the dormant Commerce Clause.204
Further, even if the D.C. Circuit’s reasoning gave a possible explanation for the
separate listing of the District of Columbia in the statute, it did not explain the rest
of the awkward wording, nor did it fully explain the inclusion of Hawaii. As to Hawaii, the explanation was that the statute protected the “continental United States”
from invasive species present in the island state; 205 however, if Congress was leaving it up to the states to protect against harm from species already present in the
country, the prohibition would not need to extend to shipments to Hawaii. In addition, the court’s cramped reading of “between” only to cover transportation
“across” the items listed in the provision would not prohibit shipments between
any two possessions of the United States not specifically listed (such as Guam and
the Northern Mariana Islands, for example).
The application of the proposed environmental canon of construction may not
necessarily have altered the outcome in the Reptile Keepers case. However, it would
have provided an alternative lens through which the court could view the question
of what the statute means. In general, substantive canons are thought not to overcome clear language in the law (although the degree of “clarity” required may depend on the strength of the presumptions associated with the canon).206 It is possible that considering the environmental canon would prompt further examination
of whether the language in the Lacey Act was actually clear, or whether the government’s position was actually a plausible reading of ambiguous phrasing. 207
With the canon as an influence on the interpretive process, the door would
then be open for the judges in the case to weigh equitably the concerns expressed
201. See U.S. Ass’n of Reptile Keepers, 852 F.3d at 1141.
202. See id. at 1139–40.
203. See id. at 1140.
204. Id. (citing Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151–52 (1986), rev’g United States v. Taylor, 752
F.2d 757 (1st Cir. 1985)).
205. See U.S. Ass’n of Reptile Keepers, 852 F.3d at 1139.
206. Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Cannons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. REV. 109, 164 (2010).
207. On the contrary, judges, aware of the applicability of such a canon, may have instead merely
seen it as another obstacle to avoid in finding the statutory meaning unambiguous—much as the panel did
with regard to Chevron deference. See U.S. Ass’n of Reptile Keepers, 852 F.3d at 1138.
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by competing principles of law in the case. On the one hand, the environmental
canon points toward an interpretation of the statute that best protects the environmental interest at stake—the safeguarding of ecological and human health from
trade in invasive or otherwise harmful species. The canon ought to be stronger in
this instance, where it lines up with the purpose underlying the broader statute, the
Lacey Act: shoring up state wildlife laws and regulating “the introduction of American or foreign birds or animals in localities where they have not heretofore existed.”208 On the other hand is the rule of lenity, which would caution toward narrow construction of the prohibited acts.209 Engaging with these competing principles would lead to a more robust decision—regardless of the ultimate outcome—
that would take into account a wider set of the concerns in fulfilling the intent of
Congress while respecting the charge to avoid irreparable harm both to individual
liberties as well as the environment.
B. Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA: “Any Air Pollutant”
In 2014, the Supreme Court decided a statutory interpretation case, Utility Air
Regulatory Group v. EPA, involving provisions of the Clean Air Act—provisions that,
in the context of regulating greenhouse gases (GHGs), appeared incompatible. 210
Following the Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in Massachusetts v. EPA,211 which held
that the Clean Air Act’s definition of “air pollutant” could encompass climate-forcing
GHGs,212 the EPA made a finding that such gases endangered human health and
welfare, and subsequently undertook to regulate GHG emissions from motor vehicles.213 The Obama Administration’s EPA concluded that its decision to regulate
GHGs from mobile sources “triggered” an obligation to regulate GHGs from stationary sources under two different portions of the Clean Air Act: the Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) program in Title I, and Title V permitting. 214 Regulation
would mean that “major” sources would be required to deploy the best available
control technology (BACT) as determined by EPA.215
The difficulty was that the BACT requirement applies to “major emitting facilit[ies],” defined in the statute as those that “emit, or have the potential to emit,”
208. Id. at 1133 (quoting Lacey Act, § 1, 31 Stat. 187, 188 (1900) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§ 701 (2012)).
209. See supra Section I.A.
210. 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014).
211. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
212. The Massachusetts decision is one of the most prominent examples of the Court taking the
broad language in a statute literally, so as to include concepts—climate-forcing pollution—not well understood at the time the original statute was drafted, but that fit within the plain reading of the statutory definitions. Jason Czarnezki has argued for such broad constructions in the face of “shifting science,” due to
congressional awareness and due to cost considerations associated with failures to regulate. See generally
Jason Czarnezki, Shifting Science, Considered Costs, and Static Statutes: The Interpretation of Expansive Environmental Legislation, 24 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 395 (2006).
213. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a)
of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496, 66,537 (Dec. 15, 2009) (known as the “Endangerment Finding”).
214. Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2436–37; Reconsideration of Interpretation of Regulations That Determine Pollutants Covered by Clean Air Act Permitting Programs, 75 Fed. Reg. 17,004 (Apr. 2,
2010) (“Triggering Rule”).
215. 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4) (2012).
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either 100 or 250 tons per year of most air pollutants. 216 For conventional pollutants, that limit posed no problem; it served the Act’s purpose of targeting a smaller
number of large sources of pollution for regulation. However, in the case of GHGs,
250 tons of carbon dioxide—the most common of the pollutants found to endanger
human health and welfare via climate change—is an insignificant amount and negligible in impact for a nationwide regulatory program.217 The EPA argued that regulation of all major sources under this definition would be inappropriate and impracticable for application because, at that level, the Act’s regulatory net would catch
thousands upon thousands of sources—including “large office and residential buildings, hotels, large retail establishments” and other categories far removed from the
EPA’s technical and practical ability to regulate. 218 As a result, EPA included in its
rulemaking a plan to “tailor” the regulation to first apply to large emitters of carbon
dioxide, beginning first with sources that already required permits for conventional
pollutants, and then to sources with the potential to emit at least 75,000 or 100,000
tons of CO2 per year.219
The Court in UARG analyzed whether the EPA had appropriately interpreted
the Clean Air Act to trigger stationary source regulation. The majority reasoned that,
although the Act-wide definition of “air pollutant” included GHGs,220 its broad
catch-all language could not apply in every “operative provision” of the Clean Air
Act, in which “EPA has routinely given [the term] a narrower, context-appropriate
meaning.”221 The crux of the statutory interpretation question in the case, then, was
how to reconcile the command to regulate “any air pollutant” from stationary
sources—or even any already regulated air pollutant (as EPA had interpreted it)—
with the apparent absurdity of classifying nearly everything as a “major source.”
The Court purported to apply the standard in Chevron to “empower[] the
agency to resolve the ambiguity” in the statute, so long as it “has acted reasonably
and thus has ‘stayed within the bounds of its statutory authority.’”222 The majority,
however, ultimately refused to defer to the EPA’s resolution of the inconsistency in
applying the Clean Air Act’s time-worn provisions to a new circumstance (to a new
pollutant with qualitatively different impacts and with significance on a different
scale of quantities than pollutants that had hitherto been regulated). The Court
216. § 7479(1). A more stringent minimum of 100 tons per year to be considered a major source
applies in Title V and to certain categories of stationary sources under Title I. §§ 7479, 7602(j).
217. For the sake of perspective, U.S. GHG emissions in 2015 totaled 6.587 billion metric tons of
carbon dioxide-equivalent—roughly twenty metric tons per person—showing the insignificance of an emission of 100 or 250 tons. See Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/inventory-us-greenhouse-gas-emissions-and-sinks (last visited Jan. 20,
2018).
218. Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2,436 (quoting Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,354, 44,498–99 (July 30, 2008)).
219. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed.
Reg. 31,514 (June 3, 2010); Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2437.
220. The broad definition is as follows: “The term ‘air pollutant’ means any air pollution agent or
combination of such agents, including any physical, chemical, biological, radioactive (including source material, special nuclear material, and byproduct material) substance or matter which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air.” 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (2012). It can also include precursor substances that lead
to the formation of air pollutants. Id.
221. Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2439.
222. Id. (quoting City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 297 (2013)).
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elaborated that in determining the meaning of the same phrase as it appears in
different places in the statute, judges “must do [their] best, bearing in mind the
‘fundamental canon of construction that the words of a statute must be read in
their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.’”223
Applying an environmental canon of construction in this case is perhaps tricky,
but would help provide guidance to judges in prioritizing the different values that
could not all simultaneously be met in any reading of the statute. The call to interpret the statute in a way most favorable to the protection of environmental interests and human health would concur with the EPA’s conclusion that its regulation
of GHGs under Title II triggered application of pollution controls for stationary
sources under Title I. However, the canon would run up against the competing
canon to avoid absurd results—covering all “major sources” of CO2 would have dramatically altered the scope of the type of entities the EPA regulates.224
Reading together the majority and the dissent’s perspective of the case, the
EPA had two options for reconciling the different provisions of the Clean Air Act
with the peculiarities of greenhouse gases—giving meaning to the statute’s clear
provisions while avoiding administrative absurdity and impracticality. It is between
those two options that the environmental canon of construction would again operate.
First (as the EPA had in fact done), the agency could interpret the stationary
source provisions to require regulation of any air pollutant—including GHGs—regulated elsewhere in the statute.225 Viewing this as consistent with the primary purpose of the statute, the EPA then bent other provisions, at least temporarily, so as
to create a practicable regulatory program.226 Alternatively, the EPA could read (as
the Court did) the details first on what constitutes major sources and conclude that,
because the numerical thresholds would make GHG regulation unworkable, it must
instead interpret the stationary source provision to apply only to a smaller subset
of pollutants—i.e., that “any air pollutant” excludes those that cannot be regulated
using the defined thresholds for major sources without creating absurd or impractical results.227
Justice Breyer, in dissent, cut to the heart of the issue. He wrote that the
proper interpretation of the statute should “assume[] that Congress was not merely
trying to arrange words on paper but was seeking to achieve a real-world purpose[.]”228 In that light
“[t]he purpose of the [250 tons per year threshold] was not to
prevent the regulation of dangerous air pollutants that cannot be
sensibly regulated at that particular threshold. . . . Rather, the
purpose was to limit the PSD program’s obligations to larger

223. Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2441 (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000)).
224. Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2430.
225. See id.
226. Id.
227. 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1) (2012).
228. Utl. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2453 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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sources while exempting the many small sources whose emissions are low enough that imposing burdensome regulatory requirements on them would be senseless.”229
This led Justice Breyer to conclude that “finding flexibility in ‘any source’ is far
more sensible than the Court’s route of finding it in ‘any air pollutant.’”230 The environmental canon of construction would provide an additional pillar for the dissent
to rely on, tilting the balance in favor of judicial resolution of the conflicting statutory provisions that facilitates environmental protection. The canon in this type of
case serves as a counterweight to the assertion of a greater judicial role in cases
with major economic interests at stake.231
C. Yates v. United States
Yates v. United States232 also exhibits the potential for complicated tension in
applying the environmental canon of construction in criminal law. In the case, Yates,
the captain of a commercial fishing boat, had caught a number of undersized red
grouper in the Gulf of Mexico.233 In federal waters, the National Marine Fisheries
Service, through regional fishery management councils, manages fishing seasons
and quotas, and regulates the minimum size for catching certain fish in order to
ensure healthy fish stocks.234 Inspectors who searched Yates’ boat at sea found undersized fish, separated them, and after issuing a citation, instructed Yates that the
fish would be seized upon his return to port.235 However, Yates ordered his crew to
throw the undersized fish overboard and replace them with slightly longer fish—a
scheme that the inspectors later uncovered.236
Yates was convicted of violating a criminal statute that prohibits the destruction or disposal of property to prevent seizure, 237 which was not in dispute on appeal. However, the government also charged him with violating a provision of the

229. Id.
230. Id. at 2452.
231. Presented with these two alternative methods for reconciling the statute’s imprecise fit to
GHG regulation, the Court effectively asserted its own authority to determine which reading was correct,
rather than deferring to the EPA. Rather than let the agency fill the gap, the Court filled it by adding in a
limitation to statute—furthering a trend away from Chevron-style deference in environmental law cases
and others with big-ticket economic implications. As Ann Carlson and Megan Herzog note, reading UARG
with the Court’s other recent cases interpreting the Clean Air Act, especially EME Homer, “provide[s] somewhat contradictory guidance about the application of Chevron to EPA’s CAA interpretations.” Ann E. Carlson
& Megan M. Herzog, Text in Context: The Fate of Emergent Climate Regulation After UARG and EME Homer,
39 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 23, 24 (2015).
232. 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015).
233. Id. at 1078.
234. See Magunson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Reauthorization Act of 2006,
Pub. L. No. 109-479, 120 Stat. 3575 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1891d (2012)).
235. See United States v. Yates, 733 F.3d 1059, 1061 (11th Cir. 2013), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015).
236. Id. at 1061–62.
237. 18 U.S.C. § 2232(a) (2012).
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Sarbanes-Oxley Act—a law enacted in response to fraud in financial markets—related to the destruction of objects to impede a federal investigation.238 That statute
reads:
Whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers
up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or
tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence
the investigation or proper administration of any matter within
the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States
. . . shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 20
years, or both.239
The Supreme Court addressed the statutory interpretation question of
whether the concept of a “tangible object” in the statute could include the fish
Yates tossed overboard.240 Although a natural reading of the phrase “tangible object” would clearly encompass a fish, a plurality of the Court employed canons of
construction to limit its application.241 In this context, the four-Justice plurality held
“tangible object” is limited to “objects one can use to record or preserve information, not all objects in the physical world.” 242
The plurality relied principally on two linguistic canons of construction, often
known by their Latin names, noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis.243 The first, noscitur a sociis, indicates that a word in a list is understood with reference to “the company it keeps.”244 In other words, the phrase “tangible object” should refer only to
those involving “records” or “documents.”245 Per the ejusdem generis canon,
“[w]here general words follow specific words in a statutory enumeration, the general words are [usually] construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those
objects enumerated by the preceding specific words.” 246 According to this rule, the
general phrase “tangible object” is limited to the category of tangible objects similar
to records or documents; were it not so, the all-encompassing broad phrase would
make the specific terms unnecessary.247
To a certain extent, the disagreement between the five Justices who voted to
overturn the lower court’s decision and the four dissenters was about whether they
saw the relevant statutory provision as ambiguous. For the dissent, the words of
the statute were perhaps harsh, but clear: a fish is a tangible object. 248 For the plurality, on the other hand, and for Justice Alito, who wrote a separate concurring
238. See Yates, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1078–79.
239. 18 U.S.C. § 1519.
240. Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1081.
241. Id. at 1081–82.
242. Id. at 1081.
243. Id. at 1085–86.
244. Id. at 1085 (citing Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 575 (1995); United States v. Williams,
553 U.S. 285, 294 (2008)).
245. Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1085–86.
246. Id. at 1086 (quoting Wash. State Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371, 384
(2003)).
247. Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1086–87.
248. Id. at 1091 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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opinion, the canons opened up significant ambiguity as to how a faithful agent of
Congress should read the statute.249
In what way would a court use a substantive canon of construction in this
case? The plurality, at the end of the opinion, noted that “if our recourse to traditional tools of statutory constructions leaves any doubt about the meaning of ‘tangible object,’ . . . we would invoke the rule [of lenity].” 250 Justice Ginsburg’s opinion
nodded to the rule of lenity even though the statute on its face was not ambiguous—there was no linguistic or syntactic question about how to read the phrase at
issue. Rather, the history of the provision made the Justices question whether the
statute’s broad language was intended to reach conduct like the defendant’s, and
the Court bent it toward a more lenient contextual interpretation.
Notably absent from the three opinions is any discussion of the value served
by the regulation of the underlying act—the prohibition on catching undersized fish.
Although the federal criminal code provisions at stake in this case, and their source
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, are not “environmental” laws, the implementation and enforcement of these provisions can have a measurable impact on environmental interests.
In this example, the environmental canon of construction would point toward
a broad reading of “tangible object.” Criminalization of efforts to obstruct investigations is likely intended both as a deterrent to such obstructions—a way to bolster
the effectiveness and accuracy of the investigative process—and as a fallback mechanism for punishing crimes for which little tangible evidence exists. Enforcement of
fisheries management rules that promote ocean sustainability becomes more difficult when someone who destroys evidence of misconduct is, so to speak, let off the
hook.
For the four dissenting Justices, the environmental canon would not have an
effect on the bottom-line outcome: they already saw the statute as clear, and limited the weight that would be given to contextual and extratextual clues. For the
other five, the canon would become important, but would also run up against other
considerations, and most notably, against the rule of lenity. The lenity rationales—
the value of ensuring adequate notice about what conduct is prohibited, and of incentivizing legislative clarity—appear to clash in this case with the value of enabling
effective enforcement for laws that promote long-term sustainability.
Reliance on the environmental canon of construction may have swung the
outcome of Yates, but with other canons and rules on the opposite side of the
ledger, that conclusion is less than certain. However, even if an appeal to the environmental canon did not prove outcome-determinative, it would still be an important tool for placing critical environmental interests in the legal discourse. If a
judge considers the environmental canon of construction, but ultimately concludes
that the rule of lenity, backed by linguistic canons, predominates, then that is the
type of reasoned decision that we should hope and expect judges to make.

249.
250.

Id. at 1088 (plurality opinion).
Id.
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VI. LOOKING FORWARD
The proposal for an environmental canon of construction is modest in that it
does not mandate a change in the way judges approach most cases of statutory
interpretation. Rather, it calls for an adjustment—a shift in the public values that
form the basis for substantive canons of construction in light of environmental crises and general concern for the rights and needs of future generations.
Support for this adjustment finds root in existing U.S. law, in past practices, in
comparative legal systems, and in the underlying legal philosophy that supports
many other canons of construction—as a check on threats to significant, but vulnerable interests. It is also important, however, to consider alternative theories and
note what an environmental canon of construction, as this Article has described it,
cannot do.
A. Why the Environmental Canon of Construction?
This section addresses some potential alternative ideas in the area of statutory interpretation as it affects environmental law. An environmental canon of construction is justified by the reasons articulated above, but its use may require some
exploration of the limits of the canon as well. Articulating the canon may lead to
additional questions about how it works and why it is necessary or beneficial for
understanding and applying the law.
First, an obvious question raised by the canon is how a judge will know which
plausible interpretation of a statute is most favorable to the environment. Or, more
generally, how does a judge know what is best for the environment, or how to make
tradeoffs among options that may have varying advantages or disadvantages for
competing environmental interests? For example, a decision that limits human exposure to air pollutants in one area might lead to indirect negative impacts on wildlife and ecosystems elsewhere.
While this may be a concern in some cases, in general it does not seem like a
different judgment in kind than others that judges make; the judiciary is wellequipped to make tradeoffs, and could do so here. Credible scientific evidence of
environmental impacts would be useful in the same ways that it is in other cases. 251
More importantly, the canon is applicable in cases where the statute is not clear; it
seems unlikely, at least in the abstract, that both the statute would be ambiguous
and that the environmental impacts (presumed to be significant) would also be
equally ambiguous. To the extent that the environmental interests relevant to the
case are unclear, that concern would suggest a more limited weight for the interpretative rule in its particular application to that case, rather than an argument
against the existence of the rule in general.
Second, one may wonder what happens when environmental interests conflict with other public values or with other recognized concerns, such as individual
251. For a critique of the Supreme Court’s use of science in environmental cases, see Robert W.
Adler, The Supreme Court and Ecosystems: Environmental Science in Environmental Law, 27 VT. L. REV. 249
(2003). Adler concludes that many “highly fragmented decisions in the environmental field can be explained, at least in part, by the fact that different justices have relied on extrinsic sources of environmental
science to greater or lesser degrees to provide context and understanding for their environmental decisions.” Id. at 369.
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property rights. We expect judges to balance competing rights and interests all the
time. Indeed, the point of the environmental canon of construction is to ensure that
there is, in fact, a balance. When a statute is ambiguous, this is not the only canon
that a court would use, but it should at least be one method for resolving statutory
interpretation questions. If a court concludes that other interpretative tools weigh
more strongly in another direction, the environmental canon of construction rightly
yields.
Third, how far does the canon reach? When applied to the core set of environmental and natural resources laws, the environmental canon of construction
may be easily aligned with broader statutory context and purpose. To what extent
is this canon still justified in interpreting other statutes? As Todd Agaard has written, environmental law is increasingly “embedded” in larger, non-environmental
programs, including tax law, transportation legislation, and food/agriculture policy.252 These programs are, notably, implemented by agencies that do not specialize
in environmental matters.253 Other laws have experienced “green drift,” incorporating, to varying degrees, some consideration of environmental principles and values, whether by legislative amendment or changes in implementation. 254 In short,
Congress has recognized that a wide variety of laws can impact the environment;
courts should too. The scope of NEPA’s call for interpretation consistent with environmental principles is universal—by its terms, it applies to all “policies, regulations,
and public laws of the United States.” 255
Additional concerns about the applicability of the environmental canon of
construction may speak more to the strength of the presumption in creates in statutory interpretation, rather than the justification for the principle. Further exploration as to how strong the presumption is, and how it works in practice in tandem
with other judicial tools for reading statutes, would be welcome. The argument
made here is that the theoretical and statutory foundation for an environmental
canon of construction is significant and that it is supported by NEPA, by analogy to
other substantive canons of construction, by principles applied in comparative law
that suggest some commonality, and by other experiences with environmental law
and judicial doctrines.256

252. See generally Aagaard, supra note 140.
253. Id. at 1272–74.
254. See generally Christopher McGrory Klyza & David Sousa, Beyond Gridlock: Green Drift in
American Environmental Policymaking, 125 POL. SCI. Q. 443 (2010). Some examples are the Federal Land and
Policy Management Act (FLPMA) and the National Forest Management Act (NFMA), both passed in 1976,
which emphasized, to a greater degree, recognition of environmental concerns in older natural resources
and land management statutes; as well as recent energy legislation, such as the Energy Policy Act of 2005
and the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007.
255. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(1).
256. A related point is whether the recognition of environmental interests as deserving of a substantive canon of construction opens the floodgates to similar claims for other interests. In general, the
principle is limited to safeguarding vulnerable interests from the potential for irreparable harm. Wherever
that is met, an analogous substantive canon may be justified. But here, an environmental canon is justified
not just by those principles but also by specific statutory text in NEPA and by comparative law examples
described above. See supra Section IV.B.
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B. What about Chevron deference?
One of the most significant challenges in U.S. environmental law is that the
law is no longer new. Most of the key framework statutes were enacted in the
1970s, and only one has been substantially amended in the nearly three decades
since the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990.257 The mismatch between aging statutes and our modern, twenty-first century understanding of environmental issues
makes effective governance a legally complicated matter.
Some scholars have argued that in the fields of environmental and energy law
a more robust application of Chevron deference258 is needed, as expert agencies are
best equipped to handle the task of updating regulatory schemes to meet new environmental challenges.259 Leaving these types of policy choices to agencies has its
virtues—including, in theory, more predictable (and more uniform) judicial decisions. However, it also has its well-described disadvantages; Chevron-style flexibility
means that agency decisions—and consequently, judicially sanctioned interpretations—may not be consistent over time, as political administrations and priorities
change. A less sanguine view of agency decision-making, in line with public choice
criticisms, cautions that agencies with flexibility will be prone to interpretations that
go against public welfare. In an era of congressional paralysis, 260 key policy issues
are constantly open for reinterpretation, undermining continuity and reliability.
Judge Calabresi’s call for a “common law of statutes” argues in favor of judicial
gap-filling as a remedy for the “statutorification” of difficult-to-update law.261 While
Chevron remains good law, several of the Supreme Court’s decisions in the past
several years have taken a more assertive approach in defining and interpreting key
statutory issues, chipping away at Chevron doctrine.262 And notwithstanding the
257. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399. Congress amended
the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) in 2016; however, its regulatory reach is narrower than the betterknown Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, and federal hazardous waste laws, for example. See Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act, Pub. L. 114-182, 130 Stat. 448 (2016).
258. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). In Chevron, the Supreme Court laid out a test for judicial review of agencies’ interpretation of statutes. Id. at 842–45. To put
it succinctly, if a court finds that a statute is clear—generally, after using ordinary tools of statutory construction—the agency has no leeway. Id. However, if the statute is ambiguous, the court will defer to an
agency’s interpretation so long as it is “permissible” within the statute, on the theory that statutory ambiguity is an implicit delegation by Congress to expert agencies to make reasoned decisions about how to
apply and implement the law. Id.
259. See, e.g., Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1,
81 (2014) (arguing that agencies are in a “far better position than courts” to “adapt obsolete statutes responsibly to new circumstances”). Freeman and Spence contend that “because the agency is the legally
designated custodian of the statue (so designated by the enacting Congress), the agency has the superior
claim to interpret the statute’s application to new problems during periods of congressional quiescence.”
Id. at 7.
260. Congressional activity, as measured by the number of public laws enacted in each two-year
Congress, has declined significantly in recent decades. See Public Laws, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/public-laws/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2018). In the 1970s and 1980s, Congress regularly enacted over
600 pieces of legislation in a two-year period; this declined sharply in the mid-1990s and again after the
2010 election to a low of 283 public laws in the 112th Congress (2011-2012). Id.
261. GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1 (1982).
262. See, e.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015); Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015). The
question of whether the approach in Chevron is justified, of course, is and has been hotly debated for many
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justification that deference constrains judicial discretion, judges can tweak the doctrine, at both steps, to meet their ideological predispositions.263
The point here is not to make a claim as to whether greater deference to agencies leads to better results. Rather, it is to suggest that an environmental canon of
construction would take on even greater importance to the extent that judicial
oversight of agency statutory interpretation increases. An environmental canon of
construction would apply more broadly to statutory interpretation cases than Chevron doctrine, which is limited to review of agency interpretations. However, in Chevron-type cases, the proposed canon would operate in both steps of the process:
first, as a consideration for judges in evaluating whether a statute is sufficiently ambiguous to afford any deference in interpretation; and second, to the extent that
the statute is ambiguous, judges should then evaluate whether an agency has interpreted it in a manner that best protects environmental interests and human
health.
In other words, to comply with NEPA Section 102(1), Chevron Step One analysis should consider whether multiple interpretations are acceptable or whether one
reading should be preferred as consistent with declared environmental policies. 264
If, after this Step One reference to the environmental canon of construction, together with other textual and contextual interpretative tools, the statute is still ambiguous, that lens is applied to determine whether an agency’s construction is “permissible.”
VII. CONCLUSION
Environmental law in the United States became established in a relatively
short period of time. The wave of new statutes in the 1970s drastically altered the
case-by-case, liability/compensation-oriented common law system of regulation of
environmental harms. In an age of legislative inflexibility, both agencies and courts
have continued to apply those statutes, and conflicts about the interpretation of
those laws have taken on even greater significance. As Justice Stevens has suggested (in a speech criticizing the holding in Michigan v. EPA, another Clean Air Act
case, in 2015), statutory interpretation in the United States is often more consequential than constitutional interpretation.265

years, but may continue to come up with the appointment of Justice Gorsuch to the Court. See, e.g.,
Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149–58 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (then-Judge
Gorsuch’s criticism of Chevron).
263. For example, at Chevron Step One, judges may disagree about whether a statute is ambiguous based on which tools of statutory construction are used, as well as what conclusions are made about
the purpose of the statute; at Step Two, judges with differing views of the “proper role of the bureaucracy
in the constitutional order” are likely to disagree about the boundaries of reasonable agency interpretations. See Freeman & Spence, supra note 259, at 78 (citing Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges
Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823 (2006)).
264. See supra Part II.
265. Justice John Paul Stevens, Address at ABA Section of Litigation International Human Rights
Award Luncheon 3 (July 31, 2015), (transcript available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/speeches/JPS_Speech_ABA_Section_of_Litigation_International_Human_Rights_Award_Luncheon
_07-31-15.pdf (“Such a free-wheeling statutory decision can do even more harm—both to the public health
and to the Court itself—than misinterpretations of the Constitution.”)
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In this context, an ecological theory of statutory interpretation shows why and
how canons of construction should be extended to protect vulnerable ecological
and intergenerational interests. The environmental canon of construction derived
from this theory is consistent with the statutory mandate in NEPA and with underlying common law and constitutional values. It offers the potential for substantive
shifts in judicial reasoning, placing environmental interests on the same level as
other public values considerations, and confers the process-oriented benefit of incentivizing clarity in environmental statutes. It also provides an answer to the issue
of eroded agency deference in major administrative law cases related to the environment.
In the early days of the modern environmental movement, Aldo Leopold
wrote of a land ethic: “A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise.” 266
Leopold saw the land ethic as an extension of ethical principles that guide our interactions with one another in society. Once we see ourselves as existing within a
broader “biotic community,” and not separate from it, we will include as part of our
ethical considerations the impact of our actions on the environment. 267
Looking forward, it is not, as Justice Scalia suggested in King v. Burwell, that
the judiciary favors particular laws;268 rather, it is that the judiciary should favor
particular interests. As a consequence, in an age when the legislature’s dialogue
with other branches of government has slowed, and when environmental crises—
and potential impacts for future generations—are becoming more clearly understood, the law is best served when judges are guided toward interpreting statutes
in a way that furthers those interests.

266. LEOPOLD, supra note 86, at 224–25.
267. See id.
268. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2507 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court’s
decisions regarding the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act “will publish forever the discouraging
truth that the Supreme Court of the United States favors some laws over others, and is prepared to do
whatever it takes to uphold and assist its favorites.”).

